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ABSTRACT
The Hot Struggle Over the Cold Waters: The Strategic Position of the Arctic
Region During and After the Cold War
Magdalena Nowak
The Arctic became a hot spot on the global map and discussion over the cold waters
became an important issue in international relations. During the Cold War, as it is
today, the Arctic was a separate area of rivalry between the superpowers. Despite the
fact that today's debate is based on different issues, including sovereignty over the
region, potential access to natural resources and the status of international waters,
there is still a strong military component to the competing interests, as there was
during the Cold War.

Funding for my thesis and my MA studies at West Virginia University, Collegium
Civitas, and the University of Tartu was made possible by the Transatlantic MA
Program in East-Central European Studies, an “Atlantis” project sponsored by the
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INTRODUCTION
On August 2 2007, the Russian polar expedition Arctic-2007 placed a titanium
Russian Federation flag below the North Pole as a symbolic proclamation of its right
to undersea Arctic areas and the resources lying at the bottom of the Arctic ocean.1
The Arctic became a hot spot on the global map and discussion over the cold waters
became an important issue in international relations. Members of the Russian
expedition, Anatoly Sagalevich, Yevgeny Chernyaev and Artur Chilingarov, after
returning to Moscow became national heroes. They were greeted with the greatest
honors and were awarded the highest state decoration "Hero of the Russian
Federation".2 Even though the Russian North Pole expedition was a national project,
it was not a scientific or pioneering achievement, but its representation in the media
had an important political role. Furthermore, shortly thereafter Moscow announced
that Russia would protect the proclaimed territories with twelve strategic Tupolev 95
bombers.3 Those practices invoked an older set of behaviors, designed to make a
point about Russian national prestige and standing that had become deeply embedded
in political, intellectual and military life of the Russian state much earlier in the
twentieth Century.
The emphasis which Moscow puts on the Arctic region is reminiscent of Soviet
times.4 Artur Chilingarov, one of the members of the successful expedition to the
North Pole in 2007 told the press: “The Arctic has always been Russian.”5 It began a
vigorous debate about the region, which the media have even pompously announced
1

Elana Rowe, Russia and the North (Toronto: University of Ottawa Press, 2009) 9.
Kremlin decree О награждении государственными наградами Российской Федерации
URL: http://archive.kremlin.ru/text/docs/2008/01/156144.shtml
3
Roger Howard, The Arctic Gold Rush: The New Race for Tomorrow's Natural Resources. (London:
Continuum, 2009) 158.
4
Ibid., 15.
5
Adrian Blomfield, “Russian explorer mocks critics - with toy bear”, The Telegraph, 7 Aug. 2007.
2
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as the New Cold War. However, it is important to understand that the contemporary
Russian Arctic policy is the direct heritage of the Soviet Arctic policy. While the
geopolitical importance of the Arctic region is at the center of the most important
political disputes of the twenty-first century, the significance of its strategic location
is not a development of the recent years, but is deeply rooted in history.6
The objective of the first part of my thesis is to examine the role of the Arctic region
during the Cold War and to oppose the view which puts the Arctic beyond
contemporary main historical discourse and neglects its role in historical
developments of the twentieth Century. My analysis will be based on a few major
questions: Should the Arctic be treated as a separate field of struggle between East
and West during Cold War or perhaps just a military training or scientific research
ground? Was the Arctic important because of military factors, resources, research, or
only as a matter of prestige? Were all the operations in the region therefore just a
reflection of other major activities and crises in different parts of the globe? Was
there a real possibility that Washington and Moscow would turn the icy depths and
frosty lands of the Far North into a nuclear inferno?
In the second part of my work I want to show how the perception of the Arctic has
changed since the collapse of the Soviet Union and determine what the contemporary
situation in the region looks like in the context of global climate change and
emergence of the new global powers. The main question I would like to answer in
this part of the thesis is whether the Arctic situation today is a heritage of Cold War
politics in the region or whether it should be seen instead as a new, separate, political
issue.

6

Charles Emmerson, The Future History of the Arctic. (New York: PublicAffairs, 2010) 31.
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An explanation of the main events and subsequent milestones in the Cold War
history of the Arctic is crucial to fully understand the dynamics of this peculiar
conflict, which was significant for international relations all over the globe for almost
half a century. In describing the development and changes in strategy towards the
Arctic during the Cold War, I would like to show how the actions of both sides in the
Arctic influenced and drove each other and how they were related to other main
events during the Cold War. Thus the goals of this thesis are fourfold. First of all, I
examine the roots of strategic thinking about the Arctic of both Cold War
protagonists. Secondly, I trace to what extent interests in Arctic were a matter of
prestige and dominance in scientific research in this hostile and unknown
environment. Third, I analyze actions in the Arctic region along with the other
incidents around the globe, where rivalry between two blocs took place, to see how
the Arctic fits in the larger history of the Cold War. And finally, I discuss the
implications of the different actions in the Arctic region for the rest of the globe.

7

PART I
Defining the Arctic
The starting point for understanding the problems of the Far North is to understand
what exactly is behind the idea of the Arctic. The Arctic can be defined in many
different ways, but in the simplest understanding, it is the area around the North Pole.
The name was derived from the Greek word arctos, which means “bear”.
Nevertheless that name should not be associated with a polar bear. Arctos was used
to describe the areas lying to the north under the constellation of the Great Bear.7 The
boundaries of the Arctic region have been described in various ways. In geography it
refers to the circle bounded by a line on a map marked with the parallel 66º 33' 39"
North. In biology, it relates to the northern boundary of natural forests.
Climatological and ecological definitions focus on the July isotherm of 50 degrees
Fahrenheit. The political scientist will see Arctic borders much further to the south,
according to the statements and policies of countries involved in the region.
Meanwhile historians have to meet the challenge of incorporating all of those ideas
into one coherent narrative, to bring out the essence of its meaning in different
historical contexts.
The main obstacle to understanding the region is the fact that there are many myths
about the Arctic, which causes misunderstanding, misstatements and undervaluation
of this space.8 Firstly, the area is considered to be completely isolated and
unpopulated. While the Arctic was a land with its own completely independent

7

Shelagah D.Grant, Polar Imperative: A History of Arctic Sovereignty in North America. (Vancouver:
Douglas & McIntyre, 2010), 5.
8
Emmerson, The Future History, p.xiv.
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civilization, it was also one of the key migration corridors over the centuries.9 It was
one of the most important migration routes to Canada and Greenland, both in periods
of cold climate, when human movement on the frozen sea was possible, as much as
in the warmer centuries allowing for transport by sea. Hence the Arctic was very
important for human civilization and, furthermore, it is crucial for historical analysis
of the so-called longue durée.10
Secondly, the Arctic is seen as a pristine corner of virgin land. Indeed, in many
places, its habitat has been untouched by humans. However, one of the keys for
understanding this region is to analyze the process of industrialization and every
attempt to tame nature in this hostile environment. The Arctic is polluted and
industrialized in many places, and projects of its exploitation and development date
back to the late eighteenth century.11 The first large-scale urbanization projects date
from the middle of the sixteenth century.12 It is true that for centuries, most
Europeans viewed the Arctic as a place unfit for year-round settlement, with the
exception of the Danish colonization of Greenland in the eighteenth century.
However, the situation changed with the subsequent discoveries of new natural
resources, first gold and then gas and oil.
The third myth, which needs to be explained, is about the immutability of the Arctic.
The High North is often seen as a place without history, a place which is not subject
to external influence, a place which does not change over time. And indeed the
9

The idea of civilization here refers to the Paleo-Eskimo Dorset culture which existed between 500
BC and 1500 AD, and which most likely became extinct due to lack of adaptation to the new, warmer
climate of the Middle Ages. Migration here refers to the Norse colonization (Vikings) in the tenth and
later centuries, their settlement in Greenland and northeastern borders of the North America
continent. Grant, Polar Imperative 32-35, 44-50.
10
Ibid.
11
The Russian-American Company, which operated a monopoly trade from Russian North America
(Alaska) from 1799 to 1867 aimed at large-scale commercial exploitation. Emmerson, The Future
History, 34.
12
Like Abbot Phillip’s building program discussed in Solovki. Emmerson, The Future History, 27.
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Arctic was not a place where the great events of history took place. However as the
examples above demonstrate, the Arctic has undergone constant change, although
until recently, it was much easier to notice this change in the longue durée than over
a single generation. Climate change over the centuries caused cooler and warmer
periods, which had its reflection in human movement in the region.13 Since the end
of the nineteenth century, which is connected with the end the so-called Little Ice
Age and new technological development, the Arctic underwent a huge
transformation.14 It was no longer a blank spot on the map, but part of a collection of
interests in a number of regions, which are increasingly more linked to each other
politically, militarily and economically.
One of the main specialists on the contemporary situation of the Arctic region,
Charles Emmerson, suggests that the main reason why the Arctic is not present in the
mainstream historical narrative is rooted in an old theory about ancient Greece and
Rome, which argues that only the right climate is capable of producing culture.15 The
fertile crescent of ancient Mesopotamia, ancient Egypt, and even ancient Greece and
Rome themselves, in fact could be used as evidence for that theory, which says that
the development of civilization in a climate of extreme cold or extreme heat is not
possible. However this view excludes a large part of Russian, Greenlandic, Alaskan
and much of Scandinavian culture, which were able to emerge far from the favorable
Mediterranean climate. Ellsworth Huntington, a geographer living at the beginning
of the last century and known for his radical views of climate determinism, believed
that any kind of progress was simply impossible in northern conditions. It just might
be conjectured whether he would have changed his mind had he seen Arctic
13

Grant, Polar Imperative, 8.
The Little Ice Age dates between 1250 and 1850 AD.
15
Aristotle believed that good life was possible only in the right temperature zone and Ptolemy
advanced the idea of climate zones with different levels of suitability for human existance.
14
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development during the Cold War, because struggle for the Arctic as an integral part
of Star Wars and the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union was
an enormous driver of change.

Image 1: Major part of the Northern hemisphere seen from the North Pole perspective

Perhaps due to the influence of these theories of connecting climate with civilization
it is often assumed that the events considered as important to note took place only in
the right temperature. Nicholas John Spykman, famous for his uncompromising
views on geographical determinism, said that “History is made in the temperate
latitudes.”16 In addition, taking into account the directions of the first geographical
discoveries, then trade or broader, relations between civilizations and later on in
international relations it is not hard to notice that they are all based on an east-west
axis.17 Looking at the globe from a slightly different perspective changes things a lot,
as in case of the Arctic region (Image 1). Furthermore, most of maps of the World

16
17

Robert D. Kaplan The Revenge of Geography (New York: Random House, 2012).
Suzanne M. Holroyd U.S. and Canadian Cooperative Approaches to Arctic Security, RAND, 1990.
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usually force us to think in east-west terms and even contemporary scholars often
neglect the Far North in their research. Robert Kaplan and George Friedman, two
influential American political scientists dealing with issues of geopolitics, virtually
omit the Arctic in their work. In his book The Revenge of Geography, Kaplan
mentions the Arctic region only a few times.18 Meanwhile, Friedman in "The Next
100 Years" argues that the United States after World War II became the dominant
force in all the oceans, which in the context of the Arctic during the Cold War is
clearly mistaken.19

18

Robert D. Kaplan In his book The Revenge of Geography mentioned the Arctic only a few times and
just as an example of a place without history and strategic importance.
19
George Friedman, The Next 100 Years: A Forecast for the 21st Century, (New York:
Anchor 2010), 17.
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PART II
The Arctic before and During the Cold War
The Arctic in no longer a cold spot but the “hot spot” on this planet. 20
Colonel Bernt Balchen
Pioneer Polar Aviator, USAAF, 1954

From Aesthetics to Pragmatism
A place as hostile to mankind as the Arctic strongly affects the human imagination. It
is a common location for movies and literature. Mary Shelley’s classic novel about
Frankenstein began and ended on the Arctic Ocean, the main character of Jules
Verne’s book The Adventures of Captain Hatteras is obsessed with the Far North,
and even more recently the biographical book and movie “Into the Wild” showed a
young man whose biggest dream was a great adventure in the wild north. It is not
surprising, therefore, that the Arctic also stimulated the imagination of travelers and
explorers. However, the Arctic had to wait for its era of discoveries to the midnineteenth century. At the beginning of the twentieth century the North Pole was still
one of the least explored and mapped places on earth. It was also one of the last spots
which had not been claimed by any “modern state”.
Although to fully understand the contemporary situation of the Arctic region it is
important to look not only into the relatively recent history of the twentieth century,
but also into the more distant past. Shelagh D. Grant is of the opinion that the present
issue of sovereignty in the Arctic is rooted in times of merchants and monarchs
between 1500 and 1814.21 The Northern Passage has been seen as an important
20

Text of speech given by Col. Bernt Balchen at the Explorer’s Club in New York, 13 February 1954,
Balchen Collection, Maxwell ABF, file 186.7053-93, as cited in Carroll V. Glines, Bernt Balchen, Polar
Aviator, (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1999), 244-45, 297.
21
Grant, Polar Imperative p.55
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trading route, which could have shortened the distance between the Old and New
Worlds. However, for centuries, maneuvers between icebergs in wooden ships were
extremely dangerous and only excellent navigators were able to accomplish it.
Fridtjof Nansen and Vilhjalmur Stefansson, two major figures in Arctic exploration,
with their discoveries and opinions created the foundation stones of the Cold War
and contemporary discourse around the Arctic. Even though they were considered as
aesthetes, they were trying to change an image of the Far North shrouded in
romanticism and mysticism into a more pragmatic one. Vilhjalmur Stefansson is the
key figure in understanding Cold War politics toward the Arctic. Already before the
Second World War, he believed that the Arctic one day would become the
“Mediterranean of the North”.22 He saw the Arctic as an important route for trade
and exchange between different regions.23 In the same way as the Mediterranean, he
perceived the Arctic region as crucial to understanding the development of many
modern societies. His interests in the north were very much connected with the fact
that he was a son of Icelandic emigrants and his first research projects were carried
out in Iceland. Regardless of his motivations, Stefansson had seen the potential of the
Far North already at the beginning of the twentieth century, which for some has
remained unnoticed even today. He was of the opinion that “it is chiefly our
unwillingness to change our minds, which prevents the North from changing into a
country to be used and lived in just like the rest of the world.”24
Stefensson, as a Canadian and a U.S. citizen, directed his vision for the development
and growth of the Arctic to the governments in Washington and Ottawa. While the
22

Ibid., 214.
Many polar explorers compared the strategic potential of Arctic Ocean to the Mediterranean Sea.
William R. Anderson, The Ice Diaries: The True Story of One of Mankind's Greatest Adventures,
(Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 2008), 57.
24
Emmerson, The Future History, 15.
23
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United States and Canada remained unpersuaded because of economic crisis of the
Great Depression, surprisingly Moscow expressed enthusiasm about Stefensson’s
ideas. In the newly formed Soviet Union, his books about the Arctic gained immense
popularity. His ideas turned into a huge national project of the USSR, and even
Stalin, convinced by Stefenssan’s views, expressed the opinion in 1932: “The Arctic
and our northern regions contains colossal wealth. We must create a Soviet
organization which can, in the shortest period possible include this wealth in the
general resources of our economic structure.”25
The development of its northern and eastern territories was an important goal of
Russian internal policy already in tsarist times, but took more organized form when
the country's capital was moved from St. Petersburg to Moscow.26 Explanation of
Soviet interest in the Far North can be found in the geography of the country. With
the longest Arctic coastline of all circumpolar countries and most of the major river
trade routes directed towards the north, one of the main objectives of Soviet
development plans was the expansion of the Arctic region. Hence the first and
second USSR Five-Year Plan included the opening of the Northern Passage and
enabling waterway transport of hinterland goods.27 The importance of the project is
shown by Stalin's personal involvement and signature on three of the large Arctic
projects.28
However, among the factors contributing to the growing Russian interest in the
Arctic, researchers also point to the increased activity of the Norwegians in the area
of the Kara Sea and the Barents Sea; transport problems during the Japanese-Russian
25

Ibid., 25.
After the Communist Revolution of 1917.
27
The big Siberian rivers: Ob, Yenisei and Lena.
28
The White Sea Canal, the development of Arctic aviation, and the Northern Sea Route; David
Fairhall, Cold Front: Conflict Ahead in Arctic Waters. (Berkeley, CA: Counterpoint, 2010), 87.
26
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war and the theory of a different outcome of the war with the possibility of a rapid
crossing of the Arctic ocean; and the loss of land after 1918 in favor of Poland,
Finland and the Baltic States, hence pushing the country’s center of gravity away
from Europe. All those subsequent discomfitures could be compensated by northern
expansion. Hence in 1926 the Central Executive Committee of the USSR
enthusiastically adopted V.L. Lakhtine’s idea of claiming all the discovered and
undiscovered lands located between Russia’s northern coast, between the meridian
32º 04’ 35” East and 168º 49’ 30” West, and the North Pole.29 According to
Lakhtine, this was the best and the most peaceful way to divide the Arctic region in
accordance to the international law. Ironically, the same Soviet scholar strongly
advocated that the North Pole itself should be a point which belonged to no one.
In the memory of Russians and the people of Central and Eastern Europe, the Arctic
is known primarily for the atrocities associated with forced deportations to Siberia,
which were experienced even by Stalin, and with the system of Gulag labor camps.
Even though labor camps in the far Siberian north are primarily remembered for their
function as political prisons, it has to be emphasized that despite of all of their horror,
in the eyes of Moscow they had a double meaning. They made an important
contribution to the industrialization of the Soviet Union and the Arctic region, and
thus to Russian conquest of their own land. Charles Emmerson remarks that for
Moscow the Russian Arctic has been all of the following: “a place of retreat, a place
of veneration, a source of national identity, a strategic bastion, a prison, a labor
camp”.30

29

V.L. Lakhtine “Rights over Arctic, American Journal of International Law” 24, 4. (October 1930),
703-717.
30
Emmerson, The Future History, 26.
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Image 2: A British wartime poster about the Arctic convoys

The intensity of Soviet activities in the Arctic region did not diminished during
World War II, but only intensified. However, due to the ongoing global conflict,
many of the major events in the region passed unnoticed. The Far North become an
important place of cooperation between the Soviets and their subsequent allies.
Initially, during the era of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, they led the German ship
HSK-7 Komet through the North Passage and provided the Germans a base for their
submarines in Murmansk.31 Then, after the German attack on the Soviet Union in
1941, the Arctic became an important point of supply from the Allies, through the
so-called Arctic convoys (Image 2). In the meantime, to maintain supremacy in the
region, the Soviets continued their conquest of the Far North and made the first
successful landing of aircraft at the most distant mainland point of the Arctic.
31

HSK-7 Komet entering the Pacific Ocean in 1940 caused huge damages to the Royal Navy.
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However, defense activities in the North during the Second World War were just a
prognostication of what was to come after the outbreak of the Cold War.

Recognition of the Arctic’s Geostrategic Importance
Even though the United States and Canada contained many who were convinced of
the strategic importance of the Far North and its significance was recognized
relatively early by some politicians and thinkers, they did not situate the Arctic in
their policy as early as the Soviet Union.32 In the nineteenth century expansion to the
north was crucial for the future history of Canada and the United States. It is hard to
imagine the Cold War fate of the Arctic without the strong involvement of Ottawa
and Washington.
After the purchase of Russian America by Washington, and after gaining control
over the northern territories from the United Kingdom by Ottawa, the U.S. and
Canada became Arctic countries. These two key transfers of territory were crucial in
the future relations of these countries with the Soviet Union, and they would be
sources of the most important geopolitical changes for the future history of the midtwentieth century. Due to financial constraints and the distance from the capital, to
the tsarist government the sale of Russian America was the most reasonable decision
at the time. However it is now considered a “geopolitical disaster”.33 Meanwhile,
from a contemporary perspective, for the United States, it was a milestone in their
history.
Even though, at the beginning, the purchase of Alaska was widely criticized, its
importance was proved during the Second World War, when it helped to build a
32

General William “Billy” Mitchell, already in the 1920s, supported the idea of Arctic exploration
with military ships and the establishment of military bases on Greenland and Iceland. Emmerson,
The Future History, 104.
33
Emmerson, The Future History, 61.
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offensive position on the Pacific Ocean, was a vital source of natural resources, and
opened up access to the Arctic Ocean.34 It is also important to note that, until the
Cold War, Alaska had not been one of the American states. It officially become the
forty-ninth state on 1 January 1959, after passage of the Alaska Statehood Act.
However, American and Canadian interest in the Far North during the Second World
War increased due to their occupation of the Iceland and Greenland, and joint
building of the first military infrastructure in the Arctic.35 That become an important
foundation for their future cooperation and at the time brought the attention of
Canadian and U.S. decision-makers to the Far North.
The end of the Second World War brought enormous changes in the international
arena. Among them, probably the most important was the new global balance of
power. After 1945, the United States and the Soviet Union become the dominant
military powers in the world and the shortest distance between the two protagonists
led through the High North. As a result of the new political situation, in a very short
period of time the relationship between East and West grew into a multi-dimensional
conflict, whereby the Arctic was transformed from a field of cooperation into a
demarcation zone only two years after the war. Over forty years of hostility between
the two blocs dominated and defined international politics and military strategies all
over the world, including a space with as complicated an international status as the
Arctic Ocean and its surrounding lands.
As soon as Washington started to notice the first signs of tensions with the Soviet
Union, American decision-makers began to see the importance of the Arctic in the
new light of the changing balance of power. Historians have been arguing for

34
35

Grant, Polar Imperative, 271.
Emmerson, The Future History, 109.
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decades where the actual origins of the Cold War can be traced. The traditional
school of interpretation points to the expansionist nature of the Soviet regime, and
Soviet ambitions to become a global power and spread communism. Revisionist
historians of the Cold War emphasize American paranoia about Moscow’s policy.36
There is no proof that the Soviet Union’s interest of the Arctic region before the
Second World War was directly connected with a geopolitical interest in the region
and an early stage of rivalry with the West, but what is certain is that Joseph Stalin
was convinced of the military significance of the Arctic region.37 The main major
difficulty in the interpretation of the Soviet Union’s different decisions, in the
context of the Stalin’s policy towards Arctic, according to Geoffrey Roberts is the
distinction between geostrategic policy goals and ideological goals.38
Regardless of the Soviet motives to involve the Arctic region in their policy,
American interest in the region was the direct result of the early stage of the Cold
War realities and a reaction to the Soviet policy. At the beginning of 1940s the
veteran polar aviators, explorers and scientists, including the earlier mentioned
Vilhjalmur Stefansson, the same person who inspired Moscow to direct its policy
towards the north, were called to assist the U.S. authorities in the creation of a
specific strategy for the Arctic region, which was recognized as an important
geostrategic place and the potential scene of military operations.39 (Image 3). Later
on Stefansson concluded that had “U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt or Canadian
Prime Minister Mackenzie King been exiled to the Arctic, as Stalin had been,

36

Melvyn P. Leffler, “National Security and US Foreign Policy” in: Melvyn P. Leffler and David S.
Painter, Origins of the Cold War: An International History, 2nd ed. (Place of publication: Publisher,
Year), 15.
37
Anderson, The Ice Diaries, 60.
38
Geoffrey Roberts “Stalin and Soviet Foreign Policy”, in Leffler and Painter, Origins of the Cold War,
54.
39
Grant, Polar Imperative, 254.
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perhaps the United States and Canada would have undergone what he described as
northward surge of development”.40 However, the threat of the attack from the north
during the Cold War was the major reason for increased American interest in the Far
North and in the formation of the long-term strategist plans for the Arctic region.

Image 3: Vilhjalmur Stefansson

The Arctic During the Outbreak of the Cold War
From 1946 to 1991, the United States and the Soviet Union confronted each other in
the Cold War, which despite its name started without any declaration of war. Instead,
it was marked by fierce and tense military and ideological rivalry, which put
international peace at stake and involved most of the world. Sooner or later every
corner of the world became involved in the Cold War struggle. Some of them almost
become flashpoints of another global conflict, among which the most commonly
recognized are the Korean War and the Cuban Missile Crisis. However, U.S. Air
Force General Hap Arnold said already in 1950 that “If there is a Third World War
the strategic center of it will be the North Pole.”41. Thus it might be said that the Far

40
41

Emmerson, The Future History, 51.
Grant, Polar Imperative p. 286
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North become much more important during the Cold War than it had ever been
before.
It is clear that at the beginning of the last century, the Arctic’s strategic military
importance was largely underestimated. Most geopolitical thinkers focused their
attention on Eurasia as the geographic center of world politics, while the Arctic
remained a marginal issue.42 The first to focus his interests on the significance of the
strategic position of the Arctic was George T. Renner, when in the 1940s, based on a
map with the North Pole at the center, he estimated the opportunities and threats
associated with this new perspective.43 However, the increase of the Arctic’s
importance is inextricably linked with the development of technology which allowed
greater exploration of the region. Shortly after the outbreak of the Cold War, in the
rhetoric of the United States, the High North began to be identified as a “mighty” and
“important” region.44 Hence, the geostrategic role of the Far North was fully revealed
during of the Cold War, when it was possible to observe real military and political
tensions on the polar waters and islands.
Even though the Cold War never became a real military conflict between the Soviet
Union and United States, strategists and military leaders on both sides were in
constant readiness for war in many different parts of the world. In the contemporary
discourse on the Cold War, the most frequently mentioned arenas of rivalry between
the two blocs were the European countries and the proxy wars carried out in Asia,
Africa and Latin America. Studies of the strategy and military installations
established after the Second World War focus on the Central and Eastern Europe and
the Mediterranean, while Soviet naval strategists emphasized many times during the
42

John Halford Mackinder treated the Arctic region as the impenetrable northern border of Europe
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Cold War the strategic position of the Arctic region.45 The Far North, the area at or
above Arctic circle, was equally important in the strategic plans of both world
powers.
In many ways the struggle for the Arctic could be compared to the other exploration
rivalries present in the international arena, like climbing in the Himalayas. Shortly
after the Second World War European states tried to prove their supremacy in
conquering the most inhospitable conditions, to bring prestige and glory to their
countries by ascending peaks of 8000 meters.46 The race for the Arctic could be
easily placed in the same category, if not for the strong military aspect of those
activities. On the other hand, the struggle for the Arctic could also be considered in
the category of scientific competition. Still little known regions of the Far North
could provide a valuable area of spectacular scientific discoveries, which could bring
prestige in the international arena. Again, this is only partially true, because of the
strong military connections of those activities. At the same time an example at the
opposite end of the globe, Antarctica, shows that for purely scientific reasons it was
possible in a relatively short period to regulate the international status of the region.47
An excellent example illustrating the ambivalent nature of the scientific projects is
the Russian Arctic drifting research station Severny Polus (Russian: North Pole). The
first station, SP-1, was built before the Second World War in 1937-1938. The project
was put on hold for the duration of the war only to be revived with new force in
1950. By the end of the Cold War, 31 Soviet stations had been established in Arctic
waters, and between 1950 and the mid-1980s at least two were in operation at the
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same time.48 Even though the project’s stated goals were strictly scientific
(meteorological measurements and measurements of ice thickness), all the
information was gathered for military purposes. The postwar defense strategy of the
Soviet Union is strongly connected with its scientific exploration of the Arctic
region.
The strategic significance of the weather stations in the northeastern Arctic was
obvious also for Washington. Thus, beginning in the early 1940s, the United States
focused on expanding their number and building radio stations in the majority on
their allies’ northern territories.49 After the war, it become clear to the United States
that in the new global situation, they had to cement their presence in the Arctic. With
forces and infrastructure in Greenland, Canada and Iceland, it was a matter of
maintaining that presence with the help of adequate treaties. The North Atlantic
Treaty Organization established in 1949 guaranteed cooperation with the other
countries in the region. Canada, Denmark, Iceland, and Norway, the most important
partners for the United States in the Arctic, were its charter members. Thus, as
Charles Emmerson remarks, by 1950, the whole Arctic belonged to one of the two
sides of the Cold War conflict.

The “War of Nerves” in the Arctic
The politics of the Cold War soon become a vicious circle of mutual fears and lack
of trust between West and East. The use of the atomic bomb by the United States at
the end of the World War II changed Soviet attitudes towards Washington.50 From
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that point one of two Soviet policy principles was the idea of the “war of nerves”,
which arose from the fear that United States would use nuclear weapons against the
Soviet Union. Hence Moscow wanted to prove that even though it did not have that
powerful weapon in its arsenal, it was not afraid to challenge Washington and act on
an equal basis, also in the Arctic.51 American strategists’ long-term plans towards the
region and the rapidity of the technological advances found their response in the
Soviet postwar defense strategy, which included both offensive and defensive
measures.
Unlike the Soviet Union, which began the development of its far north even before
the war, the northern parts of the United States and its allies were very poorly
developed. Barely populated and without the basic infrastructure, these territories
were vulnerable to attack. Therefore, the early period of the Cold War significantly
influenced the economic development of Alaska.52 It became clear that Arctic
development would be crucial for American security, and some scholars are of the
opinion that it became “central to the U.S. military’s post-war security strategy”.53
The military plans originated from the development of a network of weather stations
and airfields across the Arctic from Alaska to Greenland. This project of Arctic
development became the key component of the research programs sponsored by the
U.S. Army. The Cold War military activities had a huge impact on the economic
growth of Alaska, which cannot be compared to any other circumpolar country
region.
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Each country's defense strategy focuses on the protection of their territories.
However, in the case of the Arctic, the United States needed specific strategic plans
for the region, which required close cooperation with other countries, especially with
Iceland, Denmark and Canada, which lay on the shortest route between the two
superpowers. In the case of Iceland cooperation was established and regulated very
quickly, regardless the popular opposition from ordinary Icelanders. Washington’s
privileged position on that small island was grounded with the Marshall Plan aid,
when Iceland became its largest per capita recipient.54 Historians emphasize
Iceland’s often underestimated and neglected “key role in the defense of Northern
America during the war and postwar years”.55
This small Arctic island for centuries belonged to the Norwegian and later Danish
monarchies. After the end of the First World War, Iceland became partly
independent. During the Second World War, with the German occupation of
Denmark, Iceland fell under Nazi occupation. Just a year later it was taken by British
and Canadian forces and then the United States officially took over the responsibility
for its defense. It should be emphasized that this happened before Washington
officially entered the war. After all those years with foreign forces in the county, the
Icelandic government did not want to allow a permanent American military presence
on the island.56 In 1944 Iceland declared its full independence and started to
negotiate an agreement of military cooperation with the U.S. Army. Washington
wanted to keep troops in Iceland, since it was a strategic location for monitoring
aerial and naval activity in the Atlantic and Arctic Ocean. Iceland without its own
military forces to provide for the security of the state, quickly become a North
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Atlantic Treaty Organization member. Shortly after the outbreak of the Korean War,
at NATO’s request, Iceland entered into a bilateral treaty with the U.S., giving
Washington control of the country’s defense. While Reykjavik now had guaranteed
security in the turbulent realities of the Cold War, Washington gained air and naval
bases in the immediate vicinity of the Arctic region.57

Cooperation in the Arctic region
The situation was much more complicated in case of Canada and the negotiations
over almost every joint project with the United States required long and complicated
discussions which often ended in serious public rebukes, as in 1952 when
Washington expressed its anxiety that the Canadian government did not have “the
sense of urgency of the U.S. and appears not as seriously concerned by the Russian
threat”.58 The Government in Ottawa and Canadian popular opinion were deeply
concerned about the American infringement of their sovereignty. Talks about
cooperation in the High North began right after the war and caused intense debate
over the nature of relations between the United States and Canada. The negotiations
leading to a final arrangement were widely criticized by Canadians.59 However, their
negative attitude about cooperation in the Arctic did not found its reflection in
government opinion and thus in the agreements signed with Washington.60 Without
any other means to defend themselves, Canada and Denmark, shortly after these first
agreements, also joined NATO.
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The United States after the end of the war increased its military involvement in the
Arctic region, mainly through a projection of airpower. Due to the limited financial
and military capacity of the two countries, the presence of Americans over the
territory of Canada and Denmark was inevitable.61 Also from the American point of
view, even though the primary goal was to protect its own territory, cooperation in
the Arctic region with other countries was crucial. Despite the fact that from the very
beginning it was absolutely clear that the bilateral agreements had purely strategic
and military purposes in favor of United States, the post-war rhetoric usually
emphasized the joint and the civilian nature of the projects.62 The chosen line of
rhetoric had two main purposes. The first aimed to appease the Canadian public,
which was widely against the militarization of the Canadian Arctic and cooperation
with United States. The second purpose was rooted in the early Cold War realities. It
has to be remembered that this was still before the official outbreak of the Cold War;
thus Ottawa and Washington wanted to avoid on adverse reaction from the Soviets.63
Nonetheless, it was obvious already at that time, as Shelagh D. Grant remarks, that
“for the U.S. military planners, the prospect of leaving the Arctic unprotected until
hostilities appeared inevitable was unthinkable, particularly in light of the events
leading to World War II still fresh in memory. (…) Arctic equipment must be
developed and tested, and men trained in the techniques of polar warfare.”64
After a long negotiation process, on 28 January 1947 both Canada and the U.S.
approved the Joint Arctic Weather Station program (JAWS). It provided for the
construction of nine stations, the largest and the most significant of which was the
Eureka station (Image 4). Even though the whole project was under civilian cover
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and both sides denied for a long time the creation of a northern “Maginot Line,”
clearly the network of the weather stations and airfields across the Arctic was central
to U.S. postwar military security strategy.65 The weather stations were a foundation
for a defense system. Thus, at the same time Washington and Ottawa signed the Joint
Statement on Defense, which became a framework for the North American Air
Defense Command (NORAD) – the common defense center of Canada and the U.S.
established twelve years later.66

Image 4: Contemporary Eureka Weather Station

In the beginning, the presence of the U.S. Army on Canadian territory was very
controversial and Ottawa was concerned about the increasing numbers of the
American personnel stationed in the Canadian North.67 The JAWS cooperation
between Canada and United States, however, initiated numerous of different
scientific activities in the region, which finally led to an increasing military presence,
including joint military exercises. Numerous U.S. and Canadian military studies and
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expeditions were carried out during those years.68 For example, in the late 1940s
Colonel Bernt Balchen, the Norwegian-born polar aviator, one of the specialists
working on U.S. strategy of the Arctic region after the war, was recalled to active
service to conduct Army training in the most difficult climate conditions (Image 5).
The new experiment was based on the 1937 Soviet project Severny Polus, the idea of
aircraft landing on ice and creating drifting research stations. Balchen coordinated
the activities of the 10th Air Rescue Squadron headquartered in Alaska from 1948 to
1951 and personally carried out numerous American exercises in the Arctic. The
Canadian Army also conducted military exercises at the same time, but in
comparison to the American exercises, which seemed to be massive in terms of the
scale and measures, the Canadians focused just on equipment testing and survival
techniques.69

Image 5: Colonel Bernt Balchen

The scientific race between East and West intensified at the beginning of the 1950s,
when the United States focused their effort to keep pace with Soviet research in the
68
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Arctic region. Subsequent U.S. research and military projects in the Arctic caused
general discontent of the Canadian public. A new problem over territorial waters
arose, due to the American use of the Canadian seashore, even though Ottawa never
expressed its official disapproval of those actions.70 Furthermore, in order to
convince the public of the merits, seriousness and benefits of cooperation in the
region, in the mid-1950s the U.S. released a documentary movie discussing the
successful cooperation between the Canada and United States, based on the example
of the “MSTS Arcitc Operation 1955.”

71

Even though the movie was originally

produced as a technical film report of the Military Sea Transportation Service, it is
obvious that it had a strong propaganda purpose.72 However, according to narrator of
the short film, it was the story of cooperation and co-ordination at all levels, both
military and civilian.
The operation was the first stage of the long-negotiated project of the Distant Early
Warning (DEW) Radar System, which was one of the largest joint military projects
of Canada and the United States, and contributed significantly to the creation of
NORAD (Image 6). DEW was built in order to detect the approach of enemy aircraft
over the polar region and started operating in 1957, even though negotiations over
the radar project started already in 1952. Time and resources used to accomplish the
project proved that an attack over the North Pole was considered a real threat to the
security of North America. And indeed Washington had reasons to be concerned,
since by 1956 the Soviet Union had sent not dozens, but hundreds of aircraft to
conduct landings and carry on exploration in the Arctic region.73 The construction of
the stations was financed by the United States, while Canada obliged to provide
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manpower. However, even though the stations were managed jointly by personnel of
both countries, all of them were leased by the United States until the end of the Cold
War. The first part of the project, as shown in the movie, had as its aim to deliver
material from Seatlle to the sites where the radar was to be established in three out of
four areas between Point Barrow and Sheppard Bay, which is less than a half of the
whole line. The whole system of the DEW line consisted of sixty-three radar stations
extending from Alaska to Baffin Island. It was one of the most important
technological developments which showed that even in extremely difficult and harsh
conditions, it was possible to build and maintain complicated radar equipment. Also
the DEW line not only fulfilled its strategic purpose, but moreover had a political
role. Carrying out complicated logistical convoys in the Arctic waters at that time
also proved the Navy’s capabilities to operate in all oceans and on many different
types of shore.

Image 6: Distant Early Warning line (black dots)
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The United States Strategic Plans for the Arctic
As for Denmark, the situation was quite different. The Danes saw from the very
beginning vast opportunities to improve their security in cooperation with the United
States, since their defense capabilities after the war were extremely weak. Therefore,
immediately after the Second World War, the government in Copenhagen itself
began to seek a means of cooperation in the new realities. Washington gained the
right to operate existing defense infrastructure and build new military bases under the
American and Danish flag.

Image 7: Map of Greenland
Image 8: Thule Air Base

Transformation of the American-Danish cooperation in the military sector is well
illustrated by the history of the Thule Air Base (Images 7 and 8). The history of
Thule and its district, their importance on the Greenland map and the complexities of
the Danish and American relations in the context of that region date back to the late
nineteenth century. Robert Peary, American explorer of the Arctic, for years
regarded as the first man to reach the North Pole, created in the district a research
station and base camp for his polar expeditions. In 1910, the Danish polar explorer
33

Knud Rasmunssen founded a missionary and trade point, “The Cape York District,”
which also served as a formal intention of Danish colonization of the area. It is worth
mentioning that Rasmunssen was also the first who noticed that the flatness of the
land in the area had the great potential for building an airport. However, up until
1917 the United States also expressed territorial claims to the area, but abandoned
them after obtaining rights from Denmark to the Virgin Islands. Denmark gained
control of the area twenty years later, on the eve of the Second World War, when the
Thule district was formally established.74
The base was used extensively as an important strategic point during the Second
World War, but its story casts a shadow on Danish diplomacy at that time. In 1941, a
year after Denmark was invaded by Nazi Germany, Danish Ambassador to the
United States, Henrik Kauffmann, independently of the government in Copenhagen,
signed an initiative “I Kongens Navn” (English: “In the Name of the King”). It was
an agreement with the United States and designed to protect Greenland against
German aggression. The "Agreement Relating to the Defense of Greenland," because
that was its full name, allowed the Americans to establish military bases in
Greenland.75 It was received with great enthusiasm by the inhabitants of the island,
but the government in Denmark accused Ambassador Kauffmann of high treason.76
Immediately after the liberation of Denmark Kauffmann was rehabilitated and his
decision to sign the agreement was considered to be right. However, the new postwar government wanted to regain control over the bases, even though they had lost
their importance, before international opinion recognized new Cold War realities. In
the context of the JAWS program of the United States and Canada, Denmark decided
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to convert the existing infrastructure to a weather station. A joint weather station
operated in the years 1946-1951, until a new agreement between Washington and
Copenhagen was signed. On 27 April 1951 the Danish government ratified
Kauffmann’s agreement, providing the foundation for full-scale cooperation between
Copenhagen and Washington in the military field. This development was also
connected with the fact that two years earlier Denmark had become a member of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which made strategic cooperation inevitable.
The new terms of cooperation allowed the United States to construct military bases.
Hence, the Thule research station was immediately transformed into an air base, the
largest in the entire Arctic.77 It is important to note, that this ambitious plan of
straightening the strategic position of Thule was planned by Colonel Bernt Balchen,
the same person who conducted the first U.S. military exercises in the Arctic. He also
directed the construction of Thule Air Base in 1952.78
The base in Thule had a perfect geostrategic position to become one of the most
important points in American strategy. Only 900 miles from the North Pole, the
airbase created for the long-range bombers covered a large part of the Arctic
territories. Its construction was hidden under the secret code Operation Blue Jay and
took two years, from 1951 to 1953. This relatively long construction period was due
to the short Arctic summer season, limiting time available to work to only four
months a year. Nonetheless, most of the work was done in the first season in only
104 days. Just the first season of work absorbed enormous resources: 120 ships with
about 300,000 tons of cargo, 5 personnel ships with about 12,000 people and today it
would cost about 225 million dollars.79 At the time it was considered the largest
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military project of the United States since the end of the Second World War and one
of the greatest scientific and technological achievements in a hostile environment.80
According to the American propaganda materials from that time “Blue Jay will be
kept ready for action as long as the threat that made us [the United States] to build it
exists (...) but perhaps the thought of this colossal airbase has caused them to fault
their plans for aggression”.81 The scale and significance of the base in Thule is
perfectly illustrated by its comparison to the geopolitical importance of the Panama
Canal. The Thule Air Base was used as an example of the American efforts for
“development and security.”82

Nuclear Threat in the Icy Depths and Frosty Lands
To fully understand the Arctic during the Cold War it is crucial to put its discourse in
the context of nuclear weapons. Until 1949, the United States was the only country
that had nuclear warheads, but the intensity with which the Soviet Union began to
work on nuclear power after the American attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki led to
a situation in which the world was actually faced with the possibility of global
nuclear war.83 According to some scholars, the chances that a future war between
East and West would be conducted on a conventional basis on European soil were
relatively small. Due to technology development, strategic efforts focused on the
development of the shortest delivery route between the two countries, the Arctic.84
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Image 9: Nowaya Zemlya

In 1953, the Soviet Union made another step forward in the nuclear technology,
conducting the first successful hydrogen bomb test which triggered not only a
chemical, but also a political chain reaction. Even though, at that time all Soviet
nuclear tests were carried out in Semipalatinsk in the Kazakh Soviet Socialist
Republic, on 15 February 1954 Washington, in response to the Soviet tests, decided
to build the earlier mentioned line of radar stations, which together functioned as the
Distant Early Warning (DEW) radar system.85 Shortly after this decision, on 7
September 1954, the Soviets established a new nuclear testing ground. The new site
was located in the Arctic, on the island Novaya Zemlya, where the first atomic
charge was detonated a year later (Image 9). The United States completed the DEW
line by 1957, which together with the Thule air base, was supposed to guarantee
safety in case of Soviet attack from the north with the use of bombers.86
Interestingly, those events did not correspond to any of the significant crises of the
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Cold War. All those activities with nuclear danger in the background, took place
right after the Korean War and before the Suez Crisis. Therefore, it can be assumed
that the Arctic strategies of the superpowers went on a path independent of Cold War
politics.
The urgent need for innovation, which fueled technological development during the
Cold War, initiated one of the most peculiar projects in the American military history
of the Cold War. The secret project Iceworm was tremendous in its scale and in the
innovativeness of its idea to build a network of mobile nuclear missile launch sites
under the Greenland ice sheet (Image 10). According to historian Richard Vaughan,
project Iceworm was inspired by Bernat Balchen’s vision of Greenland as “a gigantic
aircraft carrier.”87 The aim of the project was to place medium-range missiles as
close to the Soviet Union as possible, so their range could reach Moscow, but remain
invisible for the enemy. The project was initiated in 1958, a year after the Paris
NATO summit took place and when the United States within NATO presented a
strategic plan on deployment of nuclear weapons in allied countries. The
Scandinavian countries, including Denmark, in fear of becoming a nuclear battlefield
decided to become a nuclear-free zone, which prohibited the stockpiling of nuclear
weapons on their soil in peacetime.88 Thus the Iceworm project would have been a
violation of international agreement among the alliance members, hence the
blueprints of the project were kept secret from the Danish government until the end
of the Cold War. Plans of the project were presented in a U.S. Army report Strategic
Value of the Greenland Icecap. Even though the U.S. Department of Defense
officially introduced Camp Century as a research project, it aimed to build a network
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of tunnels, within an area of about 52,000 square miles, located an average of 28 feet
below the surface of the ice, where Americans planned to deploy up to 600 nuclear
missiles at distances 4 miles from each other. It has to be remembered that Iceworm
coincided with the U.S. deployment of nuclear missiles in Italy and Turkey, which
led to the Cuban missile crisis. Thus one can only speculate that if those plans had
come to light then, the outcome of the Cold War crisis in 1962, which threatened the
security of the whole world, could have been much different. However, back then
Iceworm was hidden under a big cover project, widely known to the public as Camp
Century.

Image 10: Camp Century’s plan

The cover project launched in 1958 and described as a nuclear power Arctic research
center built to test various construction techniques under Arctic conditions, was
completed in 1960. Camp Century was a small military outpost built in 1959, about
150 miles from the Thule Air Base and about 800 miles from the North Pole. It was
an amazing project with the use of new construction techniques. Trenches dug into
the ice were covered with steel arches. Inside its tunnels were built housing facilities,
laboratories, auxiliary facilities, and the whole was built up with bricks of ice. The
39

camp was equipped with a nuclear power plant due to the small efficiency of a diesel
engine at low temperatures. Problems started only three years after opening the
outpost. At the time, exiting knowledge of the glaciers was insufficient. Engineers
did not anticipate that ice conditions were unstable to the extent that they. The ice
was subjected to such enormous stresses that it turned out that the city under the ice
collapsed much faster than was originally expected. In 1964 the nuclear power plant
was removed due to the ceiling’s collapse and just a year later, the outpost was
completely closed due to the unstable ice conditions. In 1966 project Iceworm was
cancelled. Interestingly, as Shelagh D. Grant remarks, even to this day Canadians
and Danes are not aware of the enormity of the actions taken by the United States on
their territory during the Cold War.89

The Silent War in the shadow of Star Wars
Activities in the Arctic were not only independent chapters of Cold War history, but
they were also part of the aftermath of the whole Cold War rivalry between East and
West. The late fifties brought an unexpected change in the strategic distribution of
global forces. Until 4 October 1957, the United States either militarily dominated
over the Soviet Union, or they were on the same level. However, the tables were
turned when Moscow launched into orbit the first artificial satellite, Sputnik 1. Space
projects played a huge role in the annals of Cold War propaganda, but it has to be
remembered that their primary role was to gain military advantage.
The end of the Second World War and the Allies defeat of the Third Reich were also
the beginning of a quiet war to take over German technology, including one of the
most innovative achievements of German engineers - the first ballistic missile
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Vergeltungswaffe-2, commonly known as the V-2.90 Immediately after the war, both
the United States and the Soviet Union launched rocket research programs based on
German designs. In the new realities of the Cold War, it turned out that the key was
not only have ballistic missiles built on the model of the V-2, but in particular
extending their range so they were able to reach the enemy.
While Washington began its program of developing intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs) immediately after the war, the Russians in the first instance had to develop
a nuclear weapon and only then could they focus on the development of missiles able
to reach targets in Europe. Moscow began its ICBM program after improving its
nuclear technology and conducting a test of the first thermonuclear bomb RDS-6s in
1953.91 The newly created thermonuclear warhead needed a rocket powerful enough
to carry it. In addition to their military role, intercontinental ballistic missiles could
also be used in science. A long distance ballistic missile was able to launch an
artificial satellite into space. At the same time the launching of artificial satellites
into space was a message to the other side of the conflict that the enemy had
effective intercontinental ballistic missiles. Thus, in 1955 the United States
announced that within the next two years, as a climax to the celebration of the
International Geophysical Year, it would build a rocket capable to putting an
artificial object in orbit around Earth. The race for supremacy in space had begun and
to the end of the Cold War, it was assumed that the space race began two years later,
but today NASA had confirmed that it commenced in 1955.92 Moscow immediately
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put great emphasis on the development of its space program, which aimed to
overtake the Americans and prove Soviet technological advantage.
When in 1957, Moscow successfully sent into space the first artificial satellite, the
headlines of Russian newspapers announced the glorious victory of Soviet science,
and the Americans reacted in a fit of political panic. According to John Piña Craven
it “vividly demonstrated that we [the United States] were far more vulnerable to an
attack by the Soviet Union than we had realized.”93 Sputnik proved, as one of the
American generals remarked in his diaries, “the space race was on, and the United
States appeared to be stuck at the starting blocks,” but more importantly, it showed
that Moscow had the technology for an attack with inter-continental ballistic missiles
for which the United States were not prepared.94 Of course, this success was
brilliantly exploited and inflated to unimaginable proportions in Moscow’s
propaganda, which made Washington even more concerned.
The United States reacted swiftly. Even though the U.S. was not capable of
constructing immediately an American equivalent of ballistic missiles, it decided to
change the direction of development. On 10 October 1957, the National Security
Council of the United States gathered in the White House to discuss possible
solutions. At that meeting, Undersecretary of State Christian Herter remarked that it
was necessary to assure U.S. allies that “we had not been surpassed scientifically or
military by the Soviets.”95 However, the response did not materialize immediately.
Meanwhile Moscow began preparations to launch Sputnik 2, and the pressure in
Washington continued to grow. Only one month later, the Soviets launched their
second satellite and this time they took a living creature to space. Today we know
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that Soviet propaganda tried to convince the public that the project was successful,
but in fact Laika died almost immediately after the launch. However, back then the
United States was shocked by the specter on the Moscow’s technological
domination. On December 6, 1957 Washington decided to launch its own satellite,
and the news of the Vanguard rocket project was transmitted over the whole country.
Unfortunately, the run of misfortune continued for the United States and the
Vanguard TV3 exploded only two seconds after liftoff. Commentators announced a
severe propaganda defeat for the United States.96
To change this situation the United States decided to prove their superiority in
different pioneering field. In the fifties, there were fewer and fewer places on Earth
where it was possible to make pioneering exploration achievements. The bottom of
the Arctic Ocean remained one of the most inaccessible and unexplored places on
Earth until the building of the first nuclear-powered submarine. Despite the
development of technology and the space race, the Arctic ice cover remained an
impenetrable barrier to any ship that wanted to reach the North Pole.
The idea of reaching the farthest North point by waterway came up already in the
thirties. However, for reasons of various technical limitations at the time it was
totally impossible. Nobody could determine the depth of the ice in the shallows of
the ocean reaches, and therefore there was a risk that a submarine would be trapped
between the ice and the ocean floor.97 Another problem was sailing near the
magnetic pole, where the standard compasses became useless.98 In addition,
conventional propulsion submarines required the use of electricity while submerged.
Thus to replenish the energy, it was necessary to emerge and launch internal
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combustion engines to recharge the battery. Until the invention of the nuclearpowered engine, traveling under the ice, like in a Jules Verne novel, seemed to be the
unreal dream of a madman.
When it became clear that the development of submarines was a very important field
of military development, the United States made every effort to develop this branch
of its armed forces. In January of 1954 the U.S. launched the world's first nuclearpowered ship, which in honor of Jules Verne’s vision told in Twenty Thousand
Leagues under the Sea was christened "Nautilus." The ship was the triumphant
embodiment of engineers and visionaries ideas. Its performance exceeded that of any
previous ship, was much faster and much harder to detect. If any ship could sail
under the Arctic ice, it was just the USS Nautilus. The Nautilus, the underwater gem
of the U.S. Navy, also became a solution for the technological gap between Moscow
and Washington. Until 1958 its actions were carried out in the test phase, and it had
been in use already four years when it became famous all over the world.99
For many years there was a political reason which stopped Washington from
increasing U.S. submarine involvement in the Arctic. Already after World War II the
U.S. Navy abandoned the idea of military exercises that included submarines in the
Arctic in favor of the waters surrounding Antarctica, due to the fact that having such
exercises in the Arctic region might have been too provocative for the Russians.100
Nevertheless, when it became clear that Soviet missiles posed a new threat and the
Arctic region meanwhile had become a Soviet backyard, the United States was ready
to change its opinion, even at the expense of political damage to relations with
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Moscow. In light of the technical achievements of the Soviet Union, Washington felt
compelled to embrace the new pioneering challenges.
The commander of the "Nautilus", William Anderson, was entrusted with a secret
mission, which was supposed to be the answer to Sputnik 1. Anderson was the first
man in history, who was charged with taking a submarine under the North Pole ice,
flowing from Pacific Ocean to Portland in Great Britain. This mission received the
code name - Operation Sunshine I. Many U.S. Navy admirals were of the opinion
that the mission was too risky and exposed the only U.S. nuclear-powered submarine
in the fleet, but Rear Admiral C. W. Wilkins, one of the biggest supporters of
Operation Sunshine I, said, “I believe it is a venture of great promise, in both the
fields of national defense and science.”101 In addition, American decision-makers, in
the face of the difficult political situation and the enormous pressure of the public,
were willing to take the risk. As a precaution, the crew and the commander were
obliged to maintain strict confidentiality, and Washington refrained from issuing any
public messages in case of the mission’s failure.102
The first attempt to sail under the ice was not completed successfully. The icebound,
shallow pool of the Chukchi Sea effectively blocked access to the deep waters of the
Arctic Sea. The commander of the ship decided not to risk the jewel of the U.S. Navy
and abandoned the first attempt. Operation Sunshine I had failed and the Nautilus
turned back to Pearl Harbor. However, only six weeks later, on July 23 Anderson
decided to make another attempt and Operation Sunshine II began. This time, the
captain changed the route and decided to proceed across the Beaufort Sea. This
decision turned out to be excellent, and on August 3, 1958, exactly at 23.15, the USS
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Nautilus safely reached the North Pole. Nine days later, on Aug. 12, the ship
achieved its ultimate goal and came to the English port of Portland.103 (Image 11).

Image 11: Copy of the original radio dispatch with the historic message

To announce this spectacular success as quickly as possible, near Iceland a helicopter
picked up William Anderson and transported him to Reykjavik, from where an
airplane took him to Washington so that he could personally submit a report to
President Eisenhower, who announced the mission’s success. After the quickly
organized press conference, the captain returned to the rest of the crew in England,
so that all together they could reach the base of the Royal Navy in Portland. The
success was widely publicized in the media, and after returning to the United States
the crew was welcomed with a big parade. 104
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It was a major American triumph, which helped Washington to rebuild U.S. national
prestige. The success of Operation Sunshine showed the United States’ contribution
to the exploration of the most inhospitable conditions, but also that America was
back in the technology race in an outstanding way with a military component.105 The
Presidential Unit Citation contained the following words: “The skill, professional
competence and courage of the officers and crew of Nautilus were in keeping with
the highest traditions of the Armed Forced of the Unites States and the pioneering
spirit which has always characterized our country.”106 It was clearly a military
message for Moscow, because possession of a fleet of nuclear-armed submarines
capable of passage through the Arctic Ocean filled the security gap created by
Russian ICBMs. It carried another signal for the ideological opponent from the East the United States had found a new and fast way which could be used if necessary to
attack the Soviet Union. Hence the launch of Sputnik 1 had opened a new chapter in
the history of the Arctic, which might be called the era of the “silent war”, because
from that moment U.S. submarines could operate undetected in the Arctic, in short
missile distance from the Soviet Union.107
To use effectively the military capabilities of the underwater fleet it was necessary to
know the thickness of the Arctic ice and the shape of the ocean floor. Hence in the
early 1960s the United States sent a number of secret and very dangerous military
research missions to deepen American knowledge of this area. In the 1960s with the
technological advantage and a circle of allies, United States gained unconditional
superiority over the Far North, but the Cold War was not over and the Soviet Union
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could not afford to leave the Arctic in the hands of “Western imperialists.” The
development of submarine forces served to increase research capacity in the Arctic
region. Ice observations, navigational testing and sea floor mapping were the
practical contributions in building a new technological balance between East and
West.
The advent of ballistic missile technology resulted in the need for constructing a
radar system that would be able to detect ICBMs. Because of that, already in 1959, in
the immediate vicinity of the military airbase at Thule, the first Ballistic Missile
Early Warning System (BMEWS) was installed. To ensure full protection of the
Arctic region identical radar systems were installed at the Clear Air Force Station in
Alaska and the Royal Air Force Fylingdales station in England.
Development of ballistic missiles opened yet another branch of the armaments sector
development, the construction of guided missile ships capable of carrying and
launching missiles. The first ships capable of launching a ballistic missile were the
American aircraft carriers. Thus the first successful launch of a ballistic missile from
a mobile platform was made by the Americans. The idea of creating a submarine
which would be able to launch such a missile had been designed already by the Third
Reich, but for years neither the Soviet Union nor the United States appreciated the
strategic potential of this type of weaponry and did not show any interest in this
concept. The Russians had not decided to develop a maritime ballistic missile system
until 1954, but when they finally did they constructed the world's first submarine that
carried ballistic missiles. On September 16, 1955, a submarine in the White Sea
became the first in history of to launch the projectile, on the water’s surface, from a
submarine. The United States, concerned about this situation, in 1956 started the
Polaris program, which aimed to develop ballistic missiles capable of being launched
48

from a submerged submarine. After four years of intensive work, on July 20, 1960 at
12:39 the nuclear-powered submarine USS George Washington for the first time in
history successfully executed a Submarine-launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM).108
The increasingly tense atmosphere between the superpowers and the upcoming
Cuban missile crisis were reflected in the situation in the Arctic. The technological
race visibly metamorphosed into a global demonstration of military forces. Thus
shortly thereafter the Soviet Union once again surpassed the United States and
conducted at Nowaya Zemlya the first test of an armed SLBM on October 20, 1961.
Nuclear-powered submarines, capable of launching nuclear missiles, were now
prepared to attack from undetected locations.
Moscow, quckly marked its presence in the region even more. Only ten days later, on
October 30, 1961, also at Novaya Zemlya, the Soviets conducted a successful test of
the most powerful nuclear weapon ever detonated, the Tsar Bomb. This hydrogen
bomb was about 4000 times more powerful than the Little Boy dropped on
Hiroshima during the Second World War. It was designed at the special request of
Nikita Khrushchev to show what the Soviet Union was capable of.109 Furthermore,
with heightened Cold War tensions between Moscow and Washington, the
importance of the Thule Air Base also grew. In 1961, the base was enlarged with the
United States Air Force Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS), the
reach of which extended to Soviet territories (Image 12). As a part of the “mutually
assured destruction” (MAD) strategic doctrine, most of the military projects in the
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Arctic were not kept secret and furthermore were widely announced in propaganda
as the Arctic become their most vital arena.110

Image 12: Coverage of BMEWS is shown in red, complementing the coverage provided by the
PAVE PAWS system in blue.

The Arctic and the Political Struggle
After 1962, the major Cold War problems in Cuba and Vietnam drew Washington
and Moscow’s attention away from the Arctic. The MAD doctrine assured at the
time a tenuous military balance in the region.111 However, it also required settlement
of this tense situation, especially in the context of events such as the Cuban Missile
Crisis. As a result of increasing international complications, already in 1964 the
leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union expressed a desire to reduce
nuclear arsenals. After 1965 the United States also reduced its military forces in

110

Most of the American Arctic projects were documented and publicized, very often through of
short films.
111
Mutual Assured Destruction; Col. Alan J. Parrington, USAF, “Mutually Assured Destruction
Revisited, Strategic Doctrine in Question,” Airpower Journal (Winter 1997).

50

Canada and Greenland. Shelagh D. Grant connects this fact with the failure of Camp
Century and deployment of combat units to Vietnam.112 However, in her analysis she
totally neglects the Cold War arms control treaties. After the first declaration of
intentions in 1964, Washington and Moscow began negotiations over arms control
treaties.
Even though the Cold War rivalry seemed to soften and was kept in check in the
Arctic, the Soviet Union did not throw in the sponge, and continued its struggle for
dominance of the region. When Leonid Brezhnev came to power in 1964, the
Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union, Sergey Gorshkov, gained his permission to
oversee a massive naval build-up. Gorshkov was a visionary who believed that “all
modern great powers are maritime countries.”113 The period of Leonid Brezhnev’s
rule was characterized by intense Soviet military expansion, which was also reflected
in the military development of the Soviet Arctic. Thus by the 1970s Soviet
submarines, including ballistic missile submarines (SLBN), covered all of the Arctic
area and their numbers significantly increased. Moreover, the improvement of the
Kola Peninsula’s infrastructure raised the profile of the Soviet Arctic.114 At the same
time the United States decided to downsize its forces in Canada and Denmark. The
reduction of the American forces in the Arctic region, according to some historians,
can be attributed to the failure of Camp Century or, what is more likely, to the
deployment of combat units to Vietnam that year. Another factor that could have
affected this change was the escalating space race. In the mid-sixties, both powers
laid great emphasis on the development of their lunar programs. However,
simultaneously with the reduction of the forces in Greenland and the Canadian
112
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North, the arsenal and military personnel of Alaska had not decreased.115 Washington
was still aware of the importance of the Arctic.
In the late sixties the situation in Greenland became complicated for the United
States. Although initially, right after the war, the Danes construed the government’s
decision on cooperation with the United States as an opportunity for mutual benefit,
the end of the sixth decade of twentieth century brought a significant crisis in
relations between Copenhagen and Washington. On January 26, 1968 the strategic
bomber B-52 armed with four hydrogen bombs caught fire and crashed just seven
miles from the base at Thule. The fire caused the explosion of one or more nuclear
warheads and resulted in the crashing of the aircraft together with the bombs that had
not been ruptured by the heat. Right after the accident a special crew was sent in
order to identify the crash site, find potential survivors and remove remains and
traces of the plane. After over nine months and with the help of 700 people and a
mini-submarine, the contaminated material, including snow and ice from the crash
site, had been removed.116 As a consequence of the accident the removal of the
nuclear warheads from all continuous alert flights was ordered. However,
Washington was accused of violating international treaties, according to which the
whole territory of Denmark was a nuclear-free zone. The United States rejected the
accusation, explaining that it was only a routine mission and that the nuclear
warheads were never deployed on the territory of Denmark. Paradoxically, at that
moment in history, this statement was true, because after 1965 Washington reduced
its nuclear arsenal and removed nuclear weapons from its bases in Greenland. The
Iceworm project back was still strictly confidential, thus Denmark could not know
that United States had a plan of deploying 600 nuclear missiles in Greenland.
115
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However, this situation did put a strain on bilateral relations between these two
countries and caused a large political controversy.117
The late sixties also opened a new chapter in the history of the Arctic that should be
taken into account, the era of gas and oil. In the winter of 1968-1969 at Prudhoe Bay
on Alaska’s North Slope an oil field was discovered. It immediately led to the
involvement of the new forces interested in the Arctic region, such as the oil and gas
industry.118 The high north had become important not only for political and military
reasons, but also because of its natural resources. Along with the emergence in the
international arena of new issues of oil and its supply, the issues of environmental
protection, rights of indigenous peoples, and above all the question of territorial
waters appeared.119 With the discovery of oilfields in Alaska, the new gold rush
began and with it a new debate over the High North waters arose.120 This debate
would become significant to the strategic position of the Arctic region in the twentyfirst century.
Events of the 1970s shifted international attention away from the Arctic. The United
States was preoccupied with the final, concluding phase of the Vietnam War. In the
meantime, a new Arab-Israeli conflict broke out, the result of which was a global oil
crisis and crisis in the foreign exchange market. In addition, the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan drew international public opinion away from the Arctic. Tensions in
many different parts of the world were reflected in the strong need for opening talks
aimed at reducing strategic arsenals. Two rounds of bilateral talks, called the
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Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), resulted in the signing of two treaties,
which significantly relaxed relations between East and West.
However, it did not stop the Soviets from pushing their ambitious plans for
strengthening their Northern Fleet at that time.121 Moscow, encouraged by the
success of NS Lenin, the first atomic icebreaker produced back in the fifties,
commissioned the construction of more Lenin-class vessels. In 1975, NS Arktika, a
mighty nuclear-powered icebreaker, came into service. The Soviet authorities hurried
to show the world the opportunities created by the Northern Fleet’s new acquisition,
hence Arktika was sent to the Far North with a special mission. On August 17, 1977
as the world's first surface ship, it reached the North Pole.122 (Image 13).

Image 13: Icebreaker Arktika

However, it was not a completely peaceful moment in history for the Arctic region.
During this time, the debate over the borders of the territorial waters of Arctic
countries exacerbated. Also the issue of sovereignty in the Arctic increasingly
created problems between the U.S and its allies. In the context of the tense situation
with the United States, in 1973 Canada and Denmark decided to take the crucial first
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step in resolving potential conflicts between them. The bilateral agreement carefully
defined boundaries between Greenland and the Canadian Arctic islands.123 At the
same time it was the first bilateral agreement which defined maritime borders in the
Arctic region. Reopening of the Station Nord, the U.S. weather station and airfield
closed three years earlier by the Danes in 1975, also occurred as an interesting
development at that time. Shelagh D. Grant indicates that this event can be explained
in the context of sovereignty. It illustrated perfectly to the international community
that Denmark was gradually reasserting authority over Greenland.

The Arctic Mare Sovieticum
In the 1980s, the Arctic again became a vital arena of the international struggle.
According to Charles Emmerson, at that point the Arctic became a real Mare
Sovieticum.124 Into the 1980s, under the Brezhnev regime, the USSR worked on
intensive naval development and construction. This trend did not change
significantly after Brezhnev's death in 1982. And even though Soviet military
development seemingly slowed when Mikhail Gorbachev came to power, the number
of produced ships did not decrease. At this moment, the Soviet Union possessed the
world's largest force of submarines. Up to 40 percent of all the world’s submarines
were estimated as belonging to Moscow. And even though the exact number was not
known to the West at this point, it was calculated that it was about 310 submarines of
which about 200 were nuclear-powered and the remaining 110 conventionally
powered.125 The part of the Soviet Navy responsible for the defense of northwestern
waters of USSR, including the longest and the most inhospitable coast of the Arctic
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region, the Red Banner Northern Fleet, was considered the most important but was
also the largest Soviet fleet. About 47 percent of the Soviet Navy’s submarines, 27
percent of its surface warships, 25 percent of its naval aircraft and about 20 percent
of its naval personnel belonged to the Northern Fleet.126 However not only its size,
but also its development, made the Far North a truly Soviet territory.127 The U.S
Director of Naval Intelligence emphasized that “despite the USSR’s escalating
economic and social problems, the Soviet Navy had a year of growth in 1989 which
any navy could be proud.”128
The United States, which had neglected the military situation in the Arctic since the
mid-1960s and focused on a struggling economy and territorial issues with their
closest neighbors, had to take a number of modernization measures to re-strengthen
its position in the region in 1980s. In 1982 the Thule Airbase was transformed into
the Air Force Space Command Base. In practice it meant that the main objective of
the base was changed into a more defensive one and focused on missile warning.129
Furthermore, in 1985 the United States and Canada signed the North American Air
Defense Modernization. The main purpose of the agreement was to upgrade the
obsolete DEW line into the North Warning System (NWS) and change the terms of
the ownership of these strategic facilities. The new system was equipped with 34
updated short-range radar stations and fifteen modern long-range radar stations,
which would guarantee full security of North America. The NWS was designed to be
managed by the Canadians on the territory of Canada, which was intended to
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alleviate tensions resulting from the 1970s discussion of Canadian Arctic
sovereignty. The DEW line was fully replaced in 1980s and early 1990s.130
However, the American strategy for the Arctic focused not only on defensive
objectives. Washington also had to remind Moscow about the American presence in
the region. Thus they conducted Cruise Missile tests in the Canadian Arctic. Those
military exercises provoked another round of public discussion in Ottawa.131 A tense
situation between Canada and United States was very often used to the advantage of
Moscow’s propaganda. Traffic of American oil tankers in the northern waters of
Canada provoked yet another public debate over Ottawa’s sovereignty.132 This was
cleverly used by Moscow as comments rapidly spread in Russian newspapers such
as: “the U.S. military has been rapidly encroaching on the sovereignty of that state
[Canada].”133 Despite these Russian voices, which were largely a reflection of the
Canadian political moods, Ottawa was aware of its position between the two powers.
In 1987, seeing the growing movement of Soviet and American ships on the northern
waters, the Canadian government declared that it intended to acquire three or more
submarines that were nuclear-powered. Two years later that decision would be
changed in favor of preventive measures, but at the time it caused further turmoil in
the Washington-Ottawa axis.134
In October 1987, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev visited Murmansk, the largest city
in the Arctic Circle, the most important harbor in the Russian North and home to the
Red Banner Northern Fleet. In his very geopolitically-oriented speech, Gorbachev
accused the United States of commencing a new arms race and expansionist attempts
130

Grant, Polar Imperative, 334.
Emmerson, Future History, 116.
132
Two incidents were widely commented on in Canada, the case of SS Manhattan in 1968 and the
SS Polar Sea in 1985.
133
Grant, Polar Imperative, 376.
134
Ibid., 332.
131

57

in the North. He also emphasized the peaceful nature of the Soviet Union’s relations
relation
with Scandinavian
ian countries. It seems he truly believed that while Moscow was
looking for peace
ace in the region, Washington was preparing for war, when he said:
“One can feel here the freezing breath of the "Arctic strategy" of the Pentagon. An
immense potential of nuclear destruction concentrated aboard submarines and
surface ships affects the political climate of the entire world and can be detonated by
an accidental political--military
military conflict in any other region of the world. The
militarization of this part of the world is assuming threatening dimensions.”135 He
wanted to see the High North as a peaceful spot on the map, but in the context of
Soviet military capabilit
capabilities in the region, it would be a peace
ce under the vigilant eye
of Soviet submarines (Image
Image 14
14).

Image 14: Mikhail Gorbachev in Murmansk

At that point, Moscow was even ready to sacrifice the strategic
gic significance of the
Baltic Sea to gain the Scandinavian countries
countries’ approval for its activities in the Arctic.
Meanwhile,
hile, anxiety of northern European states was growing. Norwegian State
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Secretary in the Ministry of Defense, John Kristen Skogan said in the early 1980s:
“If there was going to be some fighting in Europe, the chances of Norway being left
out were nil.”136 The change in Soviet geopolitical orientation could have been
dictated by awareness of growing anti-communist moods in Central and Eastern
Europe, but it was also possible that it was a desperate attempt to maintain power at
least in the Arctic region. Gorbachev’s initiative, although very important, did not
change the inevitable.137 Four years later, the Soviet Union could not bear the
economic, social and political challenges to its integrity and disintegrated into
successor states, of which the largest, Russia, became the main heir of the Soviet
Arctic political legacy.
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PART III
The Arctic after the Cold War
The history of Arctic discovery shows how
the development of human race has
always been borne along by great illusions.138.
Fridtjof Nansesn, 1911
Polar explorer

Past, Present and Future of the Arctic
After the end of the Cold War, tensions between Washington and Moscow greatly
eased, and the balance of power in the world completely relied on a unipolar
international system, in which the United States became the dominant state in the
international order. The Cold War clearly outlined the axis of conflict in the Arctic
around the arms race and constant nuclear threat. Thus, the High North during the
Cold War was an extremely vital arena of the political competition and, like no other
place in the world, reflected the objectives of the Mutual Assured Destruction
doctrine. The end of the Cold War brought a sharp decline in the importance of the
Far North in the strategic plans of the Arctic countries. Hence, the first decade after
the Cold War was primarily a period of dealing with the nuclear past, both in
political as well as actual terms.
The last decade of the twentieth century was largely a time of opening new forms of
cooperation between East and West. However, many of the flashpoints already
known from the times of the Cold War soon returned. In the early 1990s American
documents from the Cold War period were declassified. That prompted the
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government in Copenhagen to conduct thorough research on the extent of U.S.
military activity in Greenland. Bearing in mind the bomber accident of 1968,
Denmark wanted to examine the issues of nuclear weapon deployment in nuclear free Danish Greenland. The results were reported as an international scandal, named
by the media “Thulegate.” Within the next two years a comprehensive report
analyzing the American actions in Greenland was published.139 The report confirmed
that the United States deployed nuclear weapon in Greenland until 1965, but also
revealed the details of the unrealized project Iceworm. Although the affair could
adversely affect relations between allies within NATO, the report’s authors
approached the topic very indulgently and diplomatically, explaining that the United
States acted in good faith, and it was the Danish government to blame, since it had
vaguely defined issues concerning American nuclear weapons deployment in the
Danish Arctic in the bilateral agreement back in the 1950s.140 In the 1990s the Arctic
was present in political discourse, but mostly through political reckoning with the
past.

Dealing with the Cold War past
In the Arctic the 1990s was a period of melting ice between East and West, both
politically as well as in reality. Military issues did not disappear from the discourse;
however, they did recede into the background, while environmental issues come to
the foreground. The attempt to take environmental issues of the High North to the
international level had been initiated by Canada already during the third round of
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in the early 1970s. At that time
Ottawa proposed that the coastal countries of the Arctic region should possess
139
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special legal authority allowing them to control pollution in adjacent waters. In 1973,
in the context of the looming oil crisis which turned upside down the world’s
economy, new environmental standards became a luxury that no one could afford.141
In face of serious economic problems which Moscow had to confront in 1990s, the
Russian Navy was left underfunded. Once the pride of the Soviet navy, the Northern
Fleet was seriously neglected. Lack of resources not only prevented new
investments, but even the maintenance of the existing fleet. This situation awakened
anxious comments about the danger of radioactive contamination from the neglected
nuclear-powered submarines. The threat of nuclear weapons was replaced with a
threat of nuclear pollution. At that point, evidence emerged that many of the nuclear
reactors were in danger of being abandoned in the Arctic region. Furthermore, in
1996 a Russian-Norwegian environmental organization, the Bellona Foundation,
warned about the aging nuclear-powered submarines in the Kola Peninsula.142
Another topic that raised much controversy was the atomic testing ground at Novaya
Zemlya. It was never exactly estimated how big were the environmental damages
caused by nuclear tests carried out on the archipelago, but environmentalists have
suggested considerable negligence during the nuclear tests.143 Already in the midnineties, the Russian Minister of Atomic Energy, Viktor Mikhaylov, refuted these
accusations, arguing that the former testing ground was “as clean as New York, even
cleaner.”144 Finally, after repeated interventions of the international community, the
securitization and safety of Soviet-era nuclear infrastructure in the Arctic was done
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largely with the help of European and American participation, becoming one of the
first areas of cooperation between East and West in the Arctic region.145
Nevertheless it is worth remembering that not only the Soviet Union polluted the
Arctic region during the Cold War, but also the United States had its inglorious
contribution. Speculation over the nuclear warheads of the crashed bomber near
Thule Airbase in 1968 continued to stir controversy. Although Washington declared
the scene of the crash as completely safe and properly secured, the consequences of
this accident could be seen in the health condition of the local people for many
years.146 Similarly, the abandoned DEW Line infrastructure, with its toxic waste and
spilled oil, significantly affected the health of surrounding area’s indigenous
peoples.147
The issue of environmental protection is an extremely broad topic. Interestingly the
issues that were not so complicated from the political and economic point of view
found a common communication ground between the two sides of the Cold War.
Signed in 1973, the Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears was the first such
document, which created ground for cooperation between Canada, Denmark,
Norway, the United States and the Soviet Union in the Arctic region. It was the first
signal that the perception of the Arctic was beginning to change. Instead of the great,
cold wasteland, the Arctic environment was starting to be recognized as
exceptionally important. However the environmental issues returned with renewed
force with the break-up of the Soviet Union.
Environmental protection has since become the core of cooperation in the High
North. In 1991, eight states whose territories bordered the Arctic Circle (Denmark,
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Canada, Finland, Island, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the United States) signed the
Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy. It provided a solid foundation for the
Arctic Council established five years later, which become an international forum for
the collaboration of Arctic countries. However, the idea was not new and was
strongly advocated by Canada back in the eighties, but due to the ongoing
ideological conflict, it seemed impossible to create that kind of organization.148

Geopolitics after the Retreating Ice
The change in the perception of the Arctic in 1990s also contributed to the science
field. The fear of radioactive pollution resulted in the development of environmental
research in the Arctic. Now, submarines could be peacefully used for research
purposes. The increase of research in the Far North resulted in the study of the Cold
War’s environmental effects in the region and the first signs of climate change. One
of the scientists of the University of Washington in Seattle who analyzed the
submarine data said, “The submarine study that compared the measurements in the
1970s and 1980s with cruises in the 1990s was spectacular – they were the most
significant and dramatic results we had.”149 The suspicion that the global climate was
gradually warming was correct.150 The research conducted in the 1990s explains
why, a decade later, the Arctic again proved to be a global flashpoint.
NASA has conducted detailed studies of ice cover in the far north since 1979.
Satellite images of the Arctic Circle have provided valuable data and allowed
scientists to determine the exact annual variations of the polar ice sheet. The ice is
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growing during the cold months, hidden in the darkness of the Arctic winter, and
shrinks during the polar summer to reach its lowest level in the middle of September.
In the years 1979-2012, a steady decline of 13 percent per decade was recorded.151
Apart from satellite measurements, yet another test of the Arctic ice was conducted.
Sonar scanning of the ice sheet relative to seabed, made by submarines, indicated a
decrease in ice thickness by more than 40 percent compared to the levels recorded in
1980. “Combining the loss in extent as well as in thickness, the total volume of
Arctic ice is now a mere third of what it was in the 1980s.” 152
For the Arctic environment the loss of the ice sheet means a catastrophic change, but
climate change in the Far North has also had an enormous impact on global weather.
Moreover, an ice-free Arctic will change not only the global environment, but can
also affect other areas. Although these issues may be disquieting for
environmentalists, they might be excellent news for economists. Global warming and
the melting of the polar ice can also bring real benefits. Lack of ice means tangible
benefits for transport, through the opening of new shipping routes that allow the
shortening of traditional trade routes. An ice-free Arctic Ocean can reduce the
distance between East Asia, Europe and North America. That means a real reduction
of costs, which is also an opportunity to increase trade.
Churchill, a small Canadian town, situated on Hudson Bay just below the Arctic
Circle, is a great example of those changes. The small port played an extremely
important role in the Arctic convoy shipments of grain to the Soviet Union during
World War II. During the Cold War, because of the tense situation between the
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superpowers, the port had no possibility to fulfill any role. The buildings fell into
disrepair, and location’s uselessness from a strategic point of view obviated the need
for the port’s reconstruction and its use for military purposes. In 1997, Pat Broe
purchased the port facilities for a nominal sum. He did not anticipate the global
warming of the subsequent decade. In that decade, the time during which the bay is
covered with ice significantly shortened and raised hope for its navigability to as
many as ten months a year. Today Churchill is back again is an important trade point.
Moreover, it witnessed one of the most significant events in polar relations between
Russia and West in the post-Soviet era. In October 2007 the Russian ship Kapitan
Sviridov pulled into Churchill’s harbor and it was the first time when the port
accepted goods shipped directly from Russia. The news quickly spread around the
world and delegates from the Russian embassy were invited to announce that “Today
represents the first successful shipment on the Arctic bridge”153 However, even with
examples such as Churchill the primary economic advantage of an ice-free Far North
was greater access to natural resources.

The Arctic Black Gold Rush
The end of the Cold War awakened hopes of peace and global prosperity. The
twenty-first century has brought a much different reality than the world expected. Its
first decade was the beginning of a new era, marked by the changing global balance
of power, the emergence of new global powers, and the rise of new threats to
international peace. While the perception of the Arctic was changing, it is worth
noting that the strategic infrastructure of the Far North had not been removed. Polar
countries were still aware of the strategic potential of the Arctic. However, the
twenty-first century’s strategic imperatives looked different, largely based on energy
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security, which was becoming increasingly difficult to ensure in times of increasing
energy expenditures.
In December 2008 Moscow presented a draft of its new security strategy until 2020.
The text pointed that (sic) “international policy will focus on the access to the energy
sources of the world, including the Middle East, Barents Sea, the Arctic Region,
Caspian Sea and Central Asia. The struggle for the hydrocarbon resources can be
developed to the military of confrontation as well, which can result with violation of
balance on the Russia’s borders with the allies and increasing of nuclear
countries.”154 This statement clearly points out that the natural resources in the new
realities became what ideology had been during the Cold War.

Image 15.

According to the International Energy Outlook 2013 (IEO2013), the report of the
U.S. Energy Information Agency anticipates that global energy consumption will
154
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increase by 56 percent in the years 2010-2040. Global natural gas consumption is
expected to increase by 1.7 percent per year, so that by 2040 world natural gas
consumption is anticipated to increase by 64 percent, from 113 trillion cubic feet in
2010 to 185 trillion cubic feet in 2040. Liquid fuels, mostly petroleum-based, remain
the largest source of energy. The production of liquid fuels is expected to increase by
28.3 million barrels per day between 2010 and 2040. And although a large part of
rising energy consumption it is due to economic growth in developing countries, this
will have an impact on the entire global economy.155 (Images 15 and 16).

Image 16.

At the beginning of the twenty-first century the price of a barrel of oil began to rise
dramatically. In a short period of time it doubled. A debate on the looming oil crisis
started along with the rush for new resources. According to Daniel Yergin, chairman
of Cambridge Energy Research Associates, this was now “the fifth time that the
world is said to be running out of oil. Each time… technology and the opening of the
155
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new frontier areas has banished the specter of decline.”156 Yergin’s statement is key
to understanding why the importance of the Arctic has grown so much in the twentyfirst century. The Arctic became a solution for the new era’s problems, as Yergin
noted. While it is hard to point out the exact moment when the debate over the Arctic
started and the Far North returned to the geopolitical map after a period of stagnancy
in the 1990s, a correlation between rising oil prices and the intensification of political
activities in the Arctic region can be easily detected. The rising global demand for oil
and gas and its consequences of rising prices imply that activity in the region is
expected to increase.157

Image 17: Map of subsequent oilfield discoveries
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Alaska was the first place to prove the existence of oil reserves in the Arctic region.
Discovery of the oilfield in Prudhoe Bay in 1968 was the beginning of a new era in
the Far North. Initially estimations were that the field held up to 10 billion barrels of
oil, which made Prudhoe Bay the largest field ever discovered in North America and
almost three times larger in term of production volume than the second largest
oilfield in United States.158 The black gold rush in Alaska accelerated Canadian and
Soviet exploration programs, which quickly became almost as promising as their
American equivalent. At approximately the same time, oil was discovered in Yamalo
– Nenets Autonomous Okrug and Nenets Autonomous Okrug in Russia and
MacKenzie Delta in Canada. And even though in some Arctic areas, oil seeps have
been known and used by indigenous people in Alaska, Canada and Russia for
centuries, long before Prudhoe’s oilfield discovery, exploration had never been
carried out on a large scale.159 (Image 17).
The potential of the Arctic’s natural resources was noticed and oil companies started
to drill in the late 1960s, but the real battle for the Arctic oil started in the twentyfirst century. However, a major obstacle was the transportation cost.160 All the
discovered oilfields were far from any potential markets, thus they required advanced
infrastructure for effective use. In the 1970s the construction of long pipelines
started.161 It was already clear that the future history of resource extraction will be
closely connected to the new technologies and infrastructure. Hence, intensive work
on technologies which would allow the exploration of new Arctic resources had
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begun. Production activity grew rapidly once the transportation infrastructure was
built (Image 18).

Image 18: Annual and cumulative oil production in Arctic areas, by country.

In 2007 the U.S. Geological Survey described the Far North as “the largest
unexplored prospective area for petroleum remaining on Earth.” Indeed, it currently
produces 13 percent of the world’s oil and about 30 percent of its gas.162 Of those
amounts, most currently come from the Russian Arctic, about 80% of the oil and
99% of the gas. However, there are still places in the Arctic that remain unexploited
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and, according to the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme report,
resources in Greenland, Iceland and the Faroe Islands might significantly change
existing estimates, but not the prediction that “Oil and gas activities will remain part
of the Arctic for many decades to come.”

163

Furthermore, these activities are

expected to increase over the next several years. Global climate change is crucial to
understanding the future of the Arctic. Diminishing sea ice and thawing of
permafrost open new possibilities for the development of the region. Consequently
“the construction of new infrastructure for development and particularly
transportation will likely extend into areas currently without such human
presence.”164 However, it has to be remembered that there are many factors which
influence and control development activities in the Arctic. Most of the contemporary
limitations are not scientific or technological. The ultimate control of the Arctic’s
future lies in international relations.

Who owns the Arctic?
One of the main issues in the contemporary discourse over the Far North region is
the question of who actually owns the Arctic. During the Cold War most of the
Arctic was a military zone, and that question was asked locally in the context of
specific territorial claims. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the danger of
unleashing a nuclear inferno between East and West in the Arctic Ocean disappeared.
However, in the twenty-first century, while the temperature of the Far North waters
was increasing, the issue of international rights to those waters became extremely

163
164

AMAP, 17.
Ibid, 33.

72

hot. According to Charles Emmerson, “Over time, it is inevitable that climate change
too will affect legal regimes in the Arctic.”165

Image 19: Major Oil and Gas Provinces in the Arctic Region

Territorial issues in the Arctic have two aspects, both based on territorial claims and
the interpretation of the law of sea. The first one is connected with the acquisition of
the rights to the huge amounts of oil and gas, since some parts of the Arctic region
are the subject of territorial disputes. In this regard Canada, Denmark, Norway,
Russia and the United States, the so-called Arctic Five, claim parts of polar waters as
"national waters" or as "internal waters". The second aspect is the issue of maritime
transport and the issue of international seaways on the Arctic water, which have risen
because of the potential benefits of newly navigable routes and shipping traffic on
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the waters previously considered closed for international trade due to ice cover,
concerns over national security, and questions of environmental protection (Image
19).
When in 1930, the League of Nations failed to codify the international maritime law
at the Hague conference, the question of national waters functioned on a basis that
originated in the days when caravels still sailed the oceans.166 In effect, many
countries have based their claims to territorial waters on unilateral declarations.
Hence, for example, President Truman in September 1945 unilaterally extended
United States jurisdiction over the continental shelf lying within 200 nautical miles
off the U.S. coast, a model which has been followed by different nations in other
parts of the world. 167 The problem of territorial waters remained open over the next
decade. Thus in 1958 and again in 1960 the United Nation Conference on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS) was held in Geneva. The two conferences resulted in four
subsequent conventions, which came into force between 1962 and 1966. However,
there were still some major questions which had not been solved and caused heated
debate between different countries, even those allied in the Cold War struggle. In
1973, in the Venezuelan capital of Caracas negotiations on the UNCLOS III began
and lasted for another seven years. The UNCLOS process established specific sea
territories concepts which have been used ever since. Its conventions set the limit of
various claimed areas, measured from a carefully defined baseline. Even though the
concepts were defined very precisely, they were still subject to different
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interpretations. Furthermore, agreements between nations are not law in a sensu
stricto, thus their enforcement gave rise to many difficulties.
The legal situation of the Arctic Ocean is particularly difficult for international
relations. Even though it is almost completely surrounded by large land masses, its
middle part is far from any land and might be considered as “high sea”. However,
since the definition of “high sea” requires both the right to, and the ability to
navigate, it cannot be applied to Arctic Ocean since it is covered in ice. The issue of
permanently or seasonally frozen waters has never been codified in international
treaties. Thus the status of the Arcitc was frozen for decades in the Law of Sea.
Paradoxically, climate change helps to cover Arctic issues with already codified law,
but at the same time causes problems, since those laws were not written in the
context of the Arctic’s unique waters.168 Divergent interpretations allow tCanada,
Denmark, Norway and Russia to see the Arctic surrounding their shores as territorial
or internal waters. Meanwhile, most of the countries of the European Union and the
United States for various reasons would like to officially recognize the region as
international waters.

How the Local Became Global
During the Cold War the complicated coastline of polar North America caused
several territorial issues between the United States and Canada. One of them was the
status of the Northwest Passage, the waterway allowing circumnavigation of the
North American continent from the north. The U.S. perceived its important role in
both civilian and military communication on the Arctic Ocean. They wanted to
establish a status of international waters on this strategic corridor. Meanwhile

168

Sale, The Scramble for the Arctic, 142.

75

Canadians were seriously concerned about the increasing presence of American
forces on their territorial waters and they saw the passage as an internal water area,
subjected only to Ottawa’s control (Image 20).

Image 20: The Northwest Passage

Interestingly the debate over the Northwest Passage was accelerated by the discovery
of oil in Alaska’s Prudhoe Bay. One year after the discovery, in 1969, the American
Humble Oil & Refining Company decided to attempt a transit on the Northwest
Passage and conduct the oil tanker Manhattan though the Arctic ice. It was an effort
to prove that it was a navigable route.169 The American tanker, with special
modifications which partly turned it into icebreaker, sailed from Prudhoe Bay to the
East Coast of United States. For the first time in history, a large cargo vessel was
used in the polar waters for a commercial objective. Unfortunately, this pioneering
voyage turned into a sour point in relations between United States and Canada and
had a dramatic impact on Ottawa’s policy toward the Far North. It opened many
different questions in the international arena, including debates on the potential
profits of the oil companies making extensive use of the passage and international
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control of its navigation.170 Hence many of the issues undertaken in the UNCLOS III
agenda upon Canadian request were related to the Arctic, for example the status of
the Arctic Ocean or the legal definition of the Northwest Passage.171 Interestingly,
even though the UNCLOS III was signed during the Cold War, Canada managed to
convince the United Nations of its Arctic conception thanks to the support of
Norway, Sweden and most of all, the Soviet Union.172
The last of the three conferences on the Law of Sea did not change the international
situation of the Northwest Passage. Sixteen years later, in 1985 the U.S. Coastguard
ice-breaker Polar Sea made another transit of the passage. This time there were
Canadian coastguard officers on the ship. Thus Ottawa, even despite the social
protest, did not issue an official protest, but it did result in a statement about
Canadian boundaries, which declared “Canada’s sovereignty in the Arctic is
indivisible. It embraces land, sea and ice. It extends without interruption to the
seaward-facing coasts of the Arctic islands. These islands are joined, and not divided,
by the waters between them. They are bridged for most of the year by ice. From time
immemorial Canada’s Inuit people have used and occupied the ice as they have used
and occupied the land.”173
Recurring debate over the status of this sea route led to another international
agreement.174 In 1988 Washington and Ottawa signed the agreement on Arctic
cooperation, which aimed to systematize their common interests in security.
However, there was a specific point on the use of ice-breakers in Arctic waters. It
allowed for transportation through the passage, hence solving the practical side of the
170
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problem, but the dispute over sovereignty has not been resolved.175 Nonetheless it is
certain that “if melting ice permits, maritime transport along the North-West Passage
will play an important role.”176
After the Cold War not only climate changed. In a situation where the world is no
longer divided only between two superpowers, and new players have entered the
international game, it is clear that the status of Northwest Passage will be of interest
for the whole world, not just the United States and Canada. In addition, the
aforementioned example of Churchill in Canada shows perfectly how the Northwest
Passage became a global issue. The widely announced “Arctic bridge” opened in
2007 was also the first time when two major Arctic Sea routes, the Northwest
Passage and the Northern Sea Route (or the Northeast Passage) were connected,
enhancing the global network of trade links.177
To understand the distinction between local and global disputes over the Arctic it is
crucial to understand that territorial disputes between the United States and Canada
included much more than just a debate over the Northwest Passage. Another
unsolved territorial question lies in the Beaufort Sea, where the dispute over a piece
of coastline dates back to the days when Alaska belonged to Russian Empire and
Canada to the British Empire. Although it seemed that the problem was solved in the
fifties of the twentieth century, with the discovery of natural resources in these
waters, the issue exploded again.178 This dispute is a perfect example of a local
territorial dispute. While the Northwest Passage is an important subject for many
global players, the Beaufort Sea disagreement is just a local territorial dispute.
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Today, the Arctic Ocean is an area where forces of the five main players clash. This
so-called Arctic Five, which are five countries with the greatest influence in the
Arctic (Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia and the United States), have all claimed
territorial rights in the region. But right behind them there are other forces that also
seek a role to play a role in the Arctic, countries which nether historically nor
geographically have had much in common with the Far North, such as China,
Germany, Italy, Spain or Poland and of course the entire European Union as a
separate actor. Along with state actors, transnational companies have entered the
Arctic game and they are ready to compete with each other for the best investments.
Anglo-Dutch Shell, Russian Rosneft, Norwegian Statoil, American Exxon Mobil and
Italian Eni are companies that have invested enormous amounts of money in the
region and created strong lobbies which have to be reckoned with.179

The Russian Ocean
Some of territorial disputes in the Arctic are rooted in contemporary realities very
different from those of the Cold War while others are completely new. After the
ratification of UNCLOS, each country has been assigned a ten-year period to request
an extension of claims to the continental shelf, which provides exclusive right to
natural resources lying on the bottom of the sea belonging to the shelf.180 Norway
ratified the convention in 1996, Canada in 2003, Denmark a year later. Russia, it is
important to remember, ratified UNCLOS in 1997.181 Each of these countries upon
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ratification of the Convention launched research projects which were designed to
establish the basis for claims for extended seabed of the continental shelf.
In 2001 Russia submitted its first claim to the UNCLOS continental shelf
commission. This was one of many signs that Russia was planning to return to the
international arena as an important player. The Russian proposal involved the
establishment of new outer borders of Russia's continental shelf, which would extend
beyond the 200-mile zone approved by UNCLOS. The new Russian territorial
request included a huge part within the Russian Arctic, reaching the North Pole. The
main argument in favor of such a change was the claim to the eastern part of the
Lomonosov ridge, which as an underwater ridge could be considered an extension of
the Eurasian continent. A year later, in 2002 the UN commission asked Russia to
submit additional evidence to support the claim.182
Additional research was conducted in 2007 and 2008 as part of the Russian Program
for the International Polar Year (IPY). It is definitely not a coincidence that Moscow
planned the polar research to celebrate the IPY. The International Polar Year is a
large scientific program which focuses on the Arctic and Antarctic. It is organized by
the International Council for Science and the World Meteorological Organization.
Although 2007-2008 IPY was the third time when celebrations took place under that
name, it was actually the fourth polar year, since the 1957-1958 International
Geophysical Year was de facto the International Polar Year in a politically correct
version adapted to Cold War realities.183 There is no confirmation, but it may be
presumed that in the fifties the term polar was abandoned due to the complicated
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situation of the two polar regions. At the time the situation in the Antarctic was still
not regulated by the Antarctic treaty, which was signed in 1959 and officially entered
into force 1961.184 Meanwhile the extremely tense military situation in the Arctic,
which was described earlier, made scientific research impossible (Image 21. and
22.).

Image 21. and 22.: Official logo of IPY and IGY

Exactly fifty years after sending into space the first artificial satellite, Sputnik-1, as a
celebration of the International Geophysical Year, Russia had decided once again to
recall the strategic importance of the Arctic region. On July 10, 2007 Akademik
Fyodorov, a Russian diesel-electric scientific research vessel was launched from St.
Petersburg. Akademik Fyodorov started the Arktika 2007 expedition equipped with
two MIR Deep Submergence Vehicles and guided with the nuclear icebreaker
Rossiya. The expedition aimed to conduct the first ever crew descent on the ocean
floor at the North Pole. Of course, it was within the framework of research related to
the 2001 Russian territorial claims. In less than a month from the beginning of the
expedition, on August 2, 2007, MIR-1 reached a depth of nearly 14,000 feet below
the surface of the ice, reaching the bottom of the North Pole. The expedition left at
the bottom of pole the titanium Russian flag. It happened exactly ten years after the
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ratification of UNCLOS, when Moscow again symbolically announced to the world
its claim to the North Pole.185 (Image 22).

Image 22: Titanium Russian Flag on the Bottom of the North Pole

This was reminiscent of Cold War events in many dimensions. The expedition
officially corrected depth measurements of the seabed under the North Pole made by
the USS Nautilus in 1958, which were considered as the first reliable measurements
ever made.186 The crew taking part in the expedition after its return was greeted with
the greatest honors by the highest national officials, just as had the American crew of
Operation Sunshine. A year later, coincidentally on the fiftieth anniversary of the
success of Nautilus, the Arktika 2007 crew was awarded the highest national
award.187 Above all, it was a message that Moscow intended to fight for its dominant
role in the Arctic Ocean, just like during the Cold War.
The international response appeared immediately, Canadian Foreign Minister Peter
MacKay concluded, “You can’t go around the world these days dropping a flag
185
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somewhere. This isn’t the 14th or 15th century.”188 U.S. State Department spokesman
Tom Casey said that he was “not sure whether they’ve put a metal flag, a rubber flag
or a bedsheet on the ocean floor,” and “either way, it doesn’t have any legal standing
or effect on this claim.”189 The Foreign Minister of Russia, Sergey Lavrov, quickly
responded, “I was amazed by my Canadian counterpart's statement that we are
planting flags around. We’re not throwing flags around. We just do what other
discoverers did. The purpose of the expedition is not to stake whatever rights of
Russia, but to prove that our shelf extends to the North Pole.”190 The irreverent
response of Canadians, found its justification six years later, when in December
2013, Ottawa submitted to the UN an official request to make a proclamation about
the North Pole. The Foreign Minister John Baird explained that “We are determined
to ensure that all Canadians benefit from the tremendous resources that are to be
found in Canada's far north.”191
In 2008 the new president of the Russian Federation, Dimitry Medvedev, announced
that he viewed the Arctic as a “region of strategic importance”, which was turning
into the Russian “resource base for the twenty-first century.” It was clear that Russia
was eager to continue its expansion up north.192 The Russians are trying to
emphasize their presence in the Far North in any number of possible ways. In 2012,
they announced that they wanted to rename the Arctic Ocean to the Russian Ocean.
The controversial idea to change the name was proposed by the University of
Lomonosov professor Nikolai Pawliuk. He argued that the pioneering, exploratory
and scientific contribution of the Russians in exploring the Arctic were grounds for
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the name change. In addition, many other geographical names are aligned with a
specific country, as in the case of the Indian Ocean and the Sea of Japan. It can also
be explained with Charles Emmerson’s words, which refer to the Soviet era, but are
surprisingly relevant to the present day: “Outside the Soviet Union, as inside the
Soviet Union, development of the Arctic was presented largely as a positive and even
heroic accomplishment, rather than as a shameful and ultimately destructive episode
in Arctic history.”193 This naming proposal not only re-awakens discussion about
Russian involvement in the Arctic region, but also perfectly reflects the entire
Russian policy towards the High North.194
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The New Cold War
It might have been expected that in the twenty-first century international realities
would have changed so dramatically that the military dimension of the Arctic activity
would no longer exist. Many elements from the Cold War appeared again, however,
albeit in different form. Another military era was approaching in the history of the
Arctic. According to Rob Huebert, member of the Canadian Defense and Foreign
Affairs Institute and a professor of Political Science at the University of Calgary,
“All of the Arctic states have begun rebuilding their military forces and capabilities
in order to operate in the region. Personnel are undertaking Arctic training exercises;
submarines that can operate in ice are being developed or enhanced; icebreakers are
being built; and so forth.”195
Since 2001, many of the military operations in the Arctic region officially have been
motivated by the undermined international security order after the attacks on the
World Trade Center. The changed security landscape in the early twenty-first century
meant that the threat might come from non-state actors, rather than from other
nation-states. Increased accessibility to and activity in the region led to many anxious
opinions about the potential use of northern sea routes for smuggling weapons,
drugs, and even terrorist attacks.196 However, it is more likely that the warning
systems built during the Cold War remained on twenty-four-hour alert for a different
reason.197 Strengthening natural security forces in the Arctic region remains on
important objective for the circumpolar countries, because even though the twenty-
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first century is a peaceful time for the Arctic, military force continues to back claims
to sovereignty in the region.198
At the beginning of the new century the Russian Navy was at its weakest point in
history. On 12 August 2000 during the summer maneuvers of the Northern Fleet in
the Barents Sea, the nuclear-powered submarine Kursk sank, with a crew of 118
men. Kursk was one of the first submarines produced in the post-Soviet era. Just a
year before the accident, Kursk was considered a jewel of the Russian fleet and its
crew was one of the most honored in Russia. The ship sank in largely unknown
circumstances, probably as a result of failure of one of its torpedoes.199 The tragic
fate of Kursk reverberated in international relations. It was announced as a severe
embarrassment of the Russian Navy and a symbolic climax of the steep decline of
Russian military capability in the Arctic. “Everything about the sinking of the Kursk
– from the initial disinformation spread by Russian admiralty, to the slow response
from Moscow, to failure to accept offers of foreign assistance that might have saved
lives – reeked of mismanagement.”200
However since 1999, an upward trend started in Russia’s military spending. It rose
significantly in 2012, with a real increase of 16 percent.201 This trend was also
reflected in the Arctic. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute “Military interest in the region does exist. Canada, Denmark and Norway
are moving forces into their respective Arctic regions and acquiring weapons and
equipment for specific Arctic use. Russia has also started to expand
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its Arctic military capabilities, while the USA’s Arctic security concerns still play
only a minor role in its overall defence policy.”202
Along with the significant Arktika 2007 expedition, Moscow started to send political
and military signals to other powers, most obviously to the United States, to respect
Russia’s national interest in the Arctic region. In August 2007, Russians conducted
large-scale military exercises over the Arctic. Twelve gigant Tupolev 95 strategic
bombers, the same aircraft which dropped the Tsar Bomba over the Novaya Zemlya,
flew over the vicinity of the Bering Strait as a demonstration of Russian military
power.203 It was clearly a reflection of deeply rooted Russian fears, expressed two
years earlier in the Russian newspaper Pravda: “It has recently transpired that the US
administration plans to launch an extensive invasion in the Arctic region (…) the
USA particularly plans to build airbases in Alaska while US oil giants intend to
develop the Arctic shelf (…) it is obvious that the development of the USA’s new
objective in the Arctic region will be conducted within the scope of the nation’s
ambition to dominate the world. This intention is officially registered in the US
National Security Strategy. The document entitles Washington to possess all
necessary resources to influence the situation in all key regions of the globe. The
Arctic has become one of such regions.”204 Thus, not surprisingly the exercises held
in 2007 were only a prelude to what Russia demonstrated in the following years.
Starting in 2012, over the next three years Russia plans to spend more than 21 billion
rubles for construction and modernization of its Arctic marine infrastructure,
including modern seaports. Moscow has also recommended upgrading of the navy in
202

Siemon Wezeman, “Increased military capabilities in the Arctic reflect border demarcations, says
SIPRI 26”, SIPRI, March 2012, URL: http://www.sipri.org/media/pressreleases/2012/26-marincreased-military-capabilities-in-the-arctic-region-reflect-territorial-consolidation
203
Andrew E. Kramer, “Russia Resumes Patrols by Nuclear Bombers”, The New York Times, August
18, 2007 URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/18/world/europe/17cnd-russia.html?hp&_r=0
204
Howard, The Arctic Gold Rush, 158.

87

the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation, including a new series of ice-class patrol
ships, a squadron of ice-breaking warships, and special Arctic troops provided with
new equipment.205 In July 2011, Vladimir Putin, then the Russian prime minister,
said that "Russia will defend its strategic interests in the Arctic and expand its
presence there." Meanwhile Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov
announced plans of armaments sector production that aimed to protect the resources
of the Arctic Circle in the territories claimed by Russia. The draft budget for all
2013-15 military expenditures includes plans for further growth in nominal terms of
slightly more than 40 percent by 2015. According to the Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute, “the Increases come as Russia implements the ambitious
2011-20 State Armaments Programme and undertakes a wide-ranging reform of its
armed forces.”206
Each of the polar players have demonstrated with their actions that the Arctic region
has for them utmost importance. Many of them have emphasized the strategic
position of the Arctic region in their official policy. The Canadian government has
made protecting and strengthening Canada’s Arctic sovereignty a priority. It is
officially included in Canada’s defense policy. Ottawa’s Arctic policy is specified in
the government’s Northern Strategy created in 2009. The Danish Defense Agreement
essentially highlights the changing geostrategic significance of the Arctic. In
addition, a special Arctic strategy was adopted in 2011. Copenhagen also approved a
plan for setting up the Arctic Military Command in 2009. Norwegian defense policy
is based on the 2007 Soria Moria Declaration on International Policy. According to
the Norwegian statement, the northern part of the country has become a priority in
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national defense. Not all of those countries have equal capabilities to achieve the
ambitious goals of their Arctic policies, but they will most definitely try. Meanwhile,
the United States is the only country with the required capabilities to play the most
important role in the region, but it is the only country out of Arctic Five which did
not place Arctic strategy in its highest priorities of its defense plans. In a document
outlining security priorities for the 21st century presented in January 2012, the Arctic
was not mentioned at all. The American 2009 Arctic Policy plays only a minor role
in overall US defense policy. The US National Security Strategy, created by the
administration of President Barack Obama in 2010, and the US National Military
Strategy from 2011 mention the Far North only a few times.207 Will such a mix of
different interests result in the outbreak of a New Cold War, which the media are so
eager proclaim?
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CONCLUSION
The contemporary strategic position of the Arctic in the twenty-first century seems to
suggest extremely strong similarities to the Cold War. However, comparison to the
Cold War usually meets with the opinion that the perspective of "an armed conflict in
the Arctic is highly unlikely and that the Arctic is one of the most stable regions in
the world."208 Nevertheless it might be said, that this is exactly what makes that
comparison so accurate. During the Cold War, the situation in the Arctic perfectly
reflected all the tensions between the superpowers. Bearing in mind the doctrine of
Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), it was the only area in the world where real
military conflict could not break out. On the other hand, there is the opinion that “the
possibility of future conflict cannot be completely overruled,” although there is a
strong conviction that it would “be the result of spill-over from conflicts
elsewhere.”209 Such a possibility is even more similar to the Cold War realities.
Moreover, the rhetoric and actions of the Russians in the Arctic are a direct legacy of
the Soviet era. Russia wants to be seen as the only legitimate claimant to the Arctic.
On 2 May 2013 the Russians announced that they were the first to cross the North
Pole from Russia to Canada on military amphibious seacraft. Half a year later, before
the Winter Olympic Games in 2014, the Olympic torch on its way to Sochi was taken
to the most interesting corners of Russia, the highest peak in Europe, Mount Elbrus,
and the depths of Lake Baikal. And most interestingly, it was taken to the North Pole
by a group of scientists and explorers. The final torchbearer, Artur Chilingarov, was
the member of Arktika 2007 expedition. Furthermore, Moscow used the occasion to
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announce that the ice-breaker which took the torch “set a new record taking just 91
hours and 12 minutes to travel from Murmansk to the planet's most central point.”210
The Russian Federation, just like its predecessor, will never lose a chance to prove its
point (Image 23).

Image 23: Olympic Torch on the North Pole, Artur Chilingarov in the middle

During the Cold War, as it is today, the Arctic was a separate area of rivalry between
the superpowers. Despite the fact that today's debate is based on different issues-sovereignty in the region, potential access to natural resources, and the status of
international waters—there is still a strong military component to the competing
interests. It might even be said that the contemporary portrait of the Arctic region is
dominated with "the capabilities of the Arctic littoral states as significant military
build-ups and potential threats to security," but what significantly differentiates the
contemporary situation from the history of the Cold War is the issue of the
environment, which like never before is vulnerable to irreparable loss and
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destruction.211 And even though “it’s not really climate change that will change who
owns what in Arctic,” perhaps who owns it will save the Arctic.212
The fact that the intensification of Arctic rivalries went on its own path in
international relations perfectly demonstrates the strategic importance of the Arctic
region. When it comes to predicting the future, historians are usually wrong, but the
Arctic is a sure bet to be the scene of international competition for years to come.
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